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This paper describes a three-level toolkit – The Investment Sustainability
Toolkit. The Toolkit assists firms in improving the efficacy of one segment of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative by creating at the first level, a
strategy of conflict prevention. This strategy is followed by Common Elements
of Conflict that Resolves/Becomes Violent, and Key Areas for Stabilization as
Level II. The third and final level of the toolkit describes specific initiatives for
increasing success, through The Screening Checklist.
The paper assesses through case study, the efforts of Firestone, Inc. in
Liberia regarding regional development, stabilization, and economic
development. This is done through the lens of the 3-levels of The Toolkit and for
the purposes of illustrating lost opportunities that a Toolkit framework would
have identified by linking the success of all stakeholders. Losses That Look Like
Wins are a key focus area within the case study as are times of stability that offer
the opportunity to create institutions – civil, political, economic – to perpetuate
that stability.
This paper makes the case for corporations as social change agents, for
preceding violence, and for including a strategy, and a framework, as well as
targeted initiatives to increase the success and efficacy of this segment of CSR.
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INTRODUCTION

The area to be addressed within the body of this paper exists at the
intersection of recent research on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and
lessons learned in Conflict Prevention work.

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Conflict
Prevention

The debates within the first of these areas of study have long been about
the interaction of CSR and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP,) existing more
as a normative, “should-we/shouldn’t we” debate. The central question around
which that debate revolved was about whether corporations have the right to be
anything else other than responsible to their shareholders and to financial
performance as represented by shareholder value.
1

Recently, in the last 12-24 months, this debate and the paradigm behind it,
has shifted. The sheer volume of firms engaged in a variety of ways, in CSR
activities, has altered the discussion from should we do this to, how do we do it
well? (Economist 2008; Bird and Smucker 2007; Griesse 2007; Orlitzky 2003;
Margolis and Walsh 2003) John Ruggie of Harvard’s Kennedy School is quoted
as saying, “the theological question – should there be CSR? – is so irrelevant
today.” (Economist 2008) Skeptics, however, still challenge us with opportunities
to solidify, to evaluate, to improve, the connections between financial
performance and CSR as well as the measurements of those connections.
Selection criteria for specific CSR initiatives and for determining the skill sets
most valuable to implementation, are also among the opportunities for
clarification which skeptics offer.
An additional modifier of this altered debate is the realization that if so
many firms are engaging in CSR without the predicted market reprisals, then it is
possible that there is financial (market) benefit to the firm’s value which has
remained hidden to us given current metrics. In fact, we see in the current
accounting literature, efforts to investigate both the traditional set of metrics used
in this area and a set of potential alternative metrics in an attempt to determine if
either of these may more accurately reflect the cost and benefit reality being
experienced.
In the realm of Conflict Prevention research, efforts are categorized as
working toward either Structural prevention or Operational prevention.
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Structural prevention methods are those addressing immediate crises while
Operational are those striving to prevent crises from arising. (Carnegie
Commission 1997)
Though it is too early to have developed a corporate language for conflict
prevention (Fletcher in Nelson 2000,) the development of an in-house culture of
prevention refers to corporate efforts within the Operational category. This is also
what is meant by the term, “mainstreaming” prevention; incorporation of the
attitude of prevention into corporate culture and of strategies to prevent crisis
before it arises, into the proactive toolbox. Thinking in the direction of
mainstreaming conflict prevention into corporate culture is only just now arriving
at the threshold of the door. As recently as 2004, a survey of firms by researchers
could find no evidence of companies mainstreaming prevention (Rienstra 2004.)
Nor have governmental agencies spearheaded the integration of such a corporate
focus (Rienstra 2004.)
Firms also are often challenged by the need to determine which CSR
initiatives in which to engage. Further they are challenged to determine from
which criteria set this decision should follow. Do we choose randomly, by
personal preference, through relevance to primary business activities or by some
other set of determinants?
This paper then will add to the CSR by utilizing knowledge gained from
the conflict prevention field to provide first, a strategy for one set of CSR
activities. That strategy, incorporating mainstreaming of conflict prevention
3

knowledge for firm self-interest and success, will then be the basis for criteria by
which to select the most relevant and cost-effective tactics from among all those
available. The third area in which value is added through this paper is
implementation. By beginning with a strategy for a sub-category of CSR
initiatives, we strengthen the tactical selection criteria which then strengthens the
implementation efficiency and success. All three levels are refined and reinforced
by additional knowledge from the conflict prevention field.
The sub-category to which we refer is the gray rectangle below:

CSR CATEGORY
Compliance

Ethics

Other
Responsibility

Service

Philanthropy

BENEFIT

Max Profit
Minor Profit
and Indirect
Neutral
Cost Affordable
Cost Prohibitive
Some initiatives which fall legitimately into the CSR category are about
complying with existing laws. These will fall into the first column above,
Compliance. Other questions in CSR are about those practices in which firms
ought to engage even when it is not financially profitable for them to do so –
things like not using lead based paint on toys. These fall into the second column
4

above, Ethics. While both of these are valuable, important sources of firm
behavior, they are not at the focus of this work. This work’s focus is that slice of
firm behavior that is financially viable through cost reductions resulting from
prevention of conflict and violence. This is represented by the blue section in the
above chart and by the intersection outlined in black in the Venn diagram below.

There is much work within each
of these three spheres to which
the current effort is not relevant.

Corporate
Success

Corporate
Social
Responsibility

Conflict
Prevention

Salience of the recommendations within this paper
are to the intersection between the three –
to those initiatives which contribute to firm success within CSR
through assistance in preventing conflict or violence.
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Further, we will make the argument that many more initiatives that are
socially sustainable and prevent conflict than are currently thought, will be in the
future, shown to be financially viable to the firm and therefore in the interest of
firm success.
The necessary improvement of accounting methods enabling illustration of
financial benefits being currently realized empirically will come through
improvement of cost/benefit analysis accuracy.
In this way, the future may show a change like that which I have tried to
depict through my diagram below. This indicates the possibility that some
initiatives currently considered to be in “A,” the upper left hand quadrant where
profit is low but effectiveness is high, may be shown to be more accurately
identified as in “B,” the upper right hand quadrant, where both profit and
effectiveness are relatively high. The bottom two quadrants are irrelevant for our
purposes in this paper and indicate only that some low-profit, low-effectiveness
options would be pointless to pursue while pursuing certain ineffective initiatives
may even cause harm.
The third chapter of this work is a toolkit of tactics shown to be both cost
effective and successful. I developed this toolkit and analytical framework, which
I call The Investment Sustainability Toolkit, to match conflict prevention
instruments with correct pre-conflict situations and to implement those
instruments and initiatives through successful methods. As in all toolkits, not all

6

Future Metrics May Capture Current Reality Better
B

Effectiveness

A

No
Point

Possible
if DoNo
Harm

Profit
of the tactics will be right for all settings. By using the first two of the three
levels of the toolkit to mainstream conflict prevention into corporate culture and
from there to guide tactical selection in the third level, implementation,
sustainability, and success of initiative and of firm, will be strengthened.
The fourth chapter is a case study review of the country setting of Liberia,
reviewed as compared to the Toolkit and analytical framework identified in
chapter three. This case study analysis will indicate what The Investment
Sustainability Toolkit would have recommended tactically for three interventions.
This skill set then, that of impacting developing nations in which we work
toward greater stabilization, conflict prevention, and wealth spread, and for the
cost savings and investment protection that accrue to the investors, is a skill set
that is now, in today’s business setting reality, as critical to the success of the firm
7

and its long-term profit stream maximization as are the skill sets for political risk
mitigation, factory architecture, process efficiencies analysis, and product
delivery logistics coordination.
Conflict scholar, Michael Lund, succinctly addresses the question to be
addressed here. He puts it this way, “…there is a concerted lack of understanding
of which conflict-prevention instruments are most successful for which conflicts
and of how best to implement them…” (2006.)

8

SECTION I:

RESEARCH REVIEW OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

The Groundwork for making a self-interested business case
for corporations as social change agents

9

For thirty years, the primary debate in the area of corporate social
responsibility has been whether corporations should act as agents of social change
or not. (Friedman 1948; Jensen; Margolis and Walsh 2003; Bies 2007) Was their
responsibility to aid society through various corporate value maximizations or
was social improvement also a valuable part of the responsibility set?
Along the way, the debate included a significant alternative view
supported by a small subset of researchers, toward the idea of building a business
case for social change agency – that is, that perhaps the two responsibilities were
not exclusive of each other but in fact, might the doing of one, strengthen the
performance of the other. (Orlitzky et al 2003; Rowley and Berman 2000; Barnett
2007; Mackey 2007) A larger shift, following the first, is reflected in the research
literature as efficiency improvement research that leaves behind it the discussions
of data reflecting not causal but, co-relational, CFP improvements with CSR
activity. (Nwankwo et al 2007; Rafi Khan 2007; Griesse 2007, Aguilera et al
2007)
This topic is of such growing interest and importance, that both the
Journal of Business Ethics and the Academy of Management Review devoted
entire issues to the discussion in the summer of 2007. (June 2007, July 2007.) In
the latter, Michael Barnett, in addressing the business case debate and the possible
impact of CSR on CFP, suggests a contingency approach allowing for multiple
factors involved in varied rates of return. This he suggests as an alternative to the
murkier quest for a single, universal rate of return on CSR activities.
10

In his conclusion however he suggests an additional reason for the
challenge to the business case. Comparing it to the financial merit struggle of
other intangible assets such as RandD and marketing, Barnett reminds us that
accounting and financial methods that could explain those accurate and
financially successful “gut feelings” of managers have taken years to develop.
Such methods for this intangible asset that is CSR, may too, be simply not yet
developed to sufficiently illustrate these financial benefits.
“Most companies have no interest in exacerbating instability… all too
often they lack the skills and experience to avoid doing so.” (International Alert,
2003) Intuitively and empirically, the reality that, “the private sector has much to
lose if social development is seriously jeopardized,” (International Alert, 2000) is
not hard to relate to. Because of this, many transnational corporations (MNCs)
have, in practice, moved past this portion of the debate and toward the second
aforementioned, larger shift – how to do it well. Two causes are behind this
change in corporate behavior. The first is the anecdotal, experiential data that
easily resonates and is represented in the above two quotes. This is joined by the
realization that near universal practice (CSR) which has unearthed no financial
corrections from the market must be offering some benefit or at least, no cost, to
its shareholders despite the inability to track such benefits through shareholder
value. (Barnett 2007.) Margolis and Walsh summed it up this way in their 2003
meta-analysis of 127 studies of CSP-CFP, “A clear signal emerges…there is a
positive association, and certainly very little evidence of a negative association,
11

between a company’s social performance and its financial performance.” The
same result was reiterated by Orlitzky et al in their 52 case meta-analysis of the
same year.
In this, it is important to remember what is illustrated by the following
chart. That is, that there are those initiatives within CSR which must be done
whether or not financial benefit to the firm is ever proven. Those initiatives also
fall under what is listed below as, Ethics. That is, questions such as whether firms
should or should not pour toxins into waterways in the absence of regulation, for
instance, need to be discussed irrespective of questions of financial benefit to
firm. Questions of ethics are, as the table below indicates, outside the scope of
this paper though well within the CSR realm.

CSR Category
Compliance

Ethics

BENEFIT

Max Profit
Minor Profit
and Indirect
Neutral
Cost Affordable
Cost Prohibitive

12

Other
Responsibility

Service

Philanthropy

Definitions

As a result, despite the lack of precise accounting and financial methods
for accurately tracking the costs and benefits in order to illustrate this positive
association definitively, Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) – firms doing
business outside of their nation of origin – have made the move toward increased
efficiency and improved results from their CSR initiatives.
Nailing down exactly what is meant by CSR, however, can be as tricky as
drawing a single and universal connection between it and CFP. Waddock and
Bodwell for instance, define CSR as, “…the way in which a company’s operating
practices (policies, processes, and procedures) affect its stakeholders and the
natural environment.” (2004) This however, focuses on social but leaves out the
responsibility aspect of the concept.
Davis’s definition is as follows:
The firm’s considerations of and response to, issues beyond
the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm
to accomplish social [and environmental] benefits along with the
traditional economic gains which the firm seeks.
(Aguilera et al 2007)
In referring not to the meeting of responsibilities but instead to the
distribution of benefits, his definition reflects the more one-sided, charitable
connotations often associated with these initiatives without considering the
benefits to the firm that may accrue.
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The Economist too, seems perhaps predisposed to the altruistic
understanding as well as the generally perceived public relations aspect of CSR
with their 2005 synthesis of the CSR concept as “the art of doing well by doing
good.”
Yet that definition remains vague enough to be of little use as it is capable
of engendering at least two of the disparate major conceptions of CSR’s
possibilities. The first sentiment can be taken to reflect the non-strategic, “dogooder” sensibility – where “doing good” can mean arts, personal preference
selections, and even harmful and/or costly initiatives intended to do good. The
“headless heart” image – that of a well intentioned, good-hearted person or group
acting without sufficient input from the head – coined by World Bank
development economist William Easterly, connotes a similar possible meaning.
The second concept is referenced by the mention of “doing well” and
suggests that the definition may be instead favoring the other side of the debate,
connecting firms’ well being, perhaps financial performance, with the social
responsibility it maintains. The January 19, 2008 issue of The Economist,
carrying a fourteen page special report on corporate social responsibility, more
closely reflects this latter view. “Most of the rhetoric,” they say, “may be about
doing the right thing and trumping competitors, but much of the reality is plain
risk management.”
Henderson (2001) criticizes the notion of CSR as insufficiently defined
but still uses the following as a working definition: running business affairs “in
14

close conjunction with an array of different ‘stakeholders’, so as to promote the
goal of ‘sustainable development’. This goal he says, has three dimensions,
‘economic’, ‘environmental’ and ‘social.’” (2001) This is strongly reminiscent of
the triple bottom line idea (Elkington 1999) which, often referred to as “People,
Planet, Profit,” was standardized by the UN in early 2007. (UN ICLEI 2007)
Grayson and Hodges though, (in speech by Nigel Griffiths 2004) take a
more ethics-based approach in defining CSR as, “the alignment of business
values, purpose and strategy with the social and economic needs of customers and
consumers, while embedding responsible ethical business policies and practices
throughout the company.”
They further this definition in 2005, continuing the movement of CSR in
the direction of efficiency improvements – how to do it better instead of should
we do this. They do this first by changing the term itself, to Corporate Social
Opportunity (CSO,) and then, by operationalizing that. Which they do by saying
that it is like thinking of CSR as, “an exciting source of creativity and innovation
that can lead to corporate social opportunities in the form of innovation in
products and services, access to new markets, and building new business models.”
Though put forth to replace CSR, we can better think of this as one half or simply
one piece of the CSR domain – those opportunities beyond the cost
responsibilities inherent in the processes of the specific business. These
opportunities are exciting specifically because they refocus thinking on benefits to
the firm from CSR. One such benefit we explore here is the strong potential for
15

new niche markets that addressing current tensions and preventing violence can
create.
It is a combination of the Grayson and Hodges definition with other
factors we see as important, which will be used in this paper. CSR then would be
initiatives performed,
1. Toward the meeting of responsibilities created by the process
of the specific business,
2. Toward the effort to promote increased stabilization in situ:
social, environmental, economic, and distributional being
among the array of stabilization dimensions required, and
3. Toward the niche market creation arising from the meeting of
needs identified through conflict prevention processes.

The optimal measure of the occurrence of this version of CSR is the
presence of Maximized Mutual Gain of all stakeholders involved. Working
toward the maximization of the mutual gain to all stakeholders moves the private
sector toward non-zero sum settings. In these settings, increasing the size of the
economy – often referred to as “building a bigger pie” – is the result as opposed to
the current action set – moving around the distribution within the “pie” or
economy at its existing size. This is why “creativity and innovation” must be
involved in the process and why an “array of dimensions” must be considered.

16

In order to be accurate however, this measure must include the gain (or
loss) to all stakeholders and through time – as must our cost/benefit portions of
our decision making. That is, if it is accuracy which we want. Doing this
though, requires looking not only beyond our own lenses, but also beyond what
Karl Popper refers to as “interpretation in the light of previous experience,” and
which I will refer to as the meta-paradigms of one’s own context (temporal,
geographical) and into those of other stakeholders – viewing costs they see but
decision-maker may not.
Two brief examples of costly meta-paradigms illustrate. In twentieth
century negotiations regarding land and water issues affecting native Americans
in North America, the native Americans themselves were not invited to the
negotiation table. This proved extremely costly in that decisions made in those
dialogueues started out at best as incomplete and becoming irrelevant from there.
Similarly, in considerations of governance and boundary issues in
colonized regions of Africa, the colonized peoples themselves were not included
in the discussions. (Cooper 2002) In both, the exclusions proved extensively
costly (Cooper 2002) to those who had been party to the decisions. At the same
time, the exclusions were well within the meta-paradigm governing thinking at
the time. It would have been only by interpreting the setting and events from
outside those paradigms that the less costly, inclusive behavior, could have been
considered. These are examples of how costs can remain hidden simply because
of the representational system we are using to describe reality to ourselves. It also
17

illustrates why looking through the largest lens of inclusivity and, through
multiple representational systems, allows us the greatest likelihood of first finding
stakeholders and then, benefit from including them and the information they hold.
Cost accuracy, as well as valuable input, is lost in the presence of stakeholder
exclusions. The result is decisions that appear potentially successful only because
of the hidden nature of a sub-set of costs.
There is a fear that occasionally accompanies an increase in total number
of stakeholders represented. It is the fear that the distribution of resources to each
stakeholder will decrease. That fear is unfounded. Through the additional
information gained from participants newly represented, the “pie” can be made
bigger; settings can be turned from seeming to be zero-sum to non-zero-sum,
instead of redistributing within a “pie” whose size has remained unaltered by the
additional inputs. Beyond this, the stakeholders are stakeholders whether they are
represented and contributing or not. Pretending they are not by not including
them or the data they represent in decision making will not increase the accuracy
of that decision making process.
Turning Maximized Present Value discussions
Into Competitive Advantage discussions

Mackey, Mackey and Barney (2007) offer a model of CSR work from the
standpoint of supply of and demand for socially responsible investment
opportunities. In this model though, the discussion seems to have moved
18

backward, returning to the part of the debate that assumes CSR as external
altruism and not internal meeting of business-created responsibility.
Bies et al (2007) describe the supply and demand model offered by
Mackey, Mackey, and Barney (2007) in this way. “One of the insights of this
model is its explanation of why firms might fund socially responsible investments
that do not maximize the present value of future cash flows…” This depiction is
reiterated in their own conclusion where they argue that, “sometimes firms should
invest in socially responsible activities, even if those activities reduce the present
value of a firm’s cash flows.” This depiction represents that subset of CSR that
fits into the Compliance and Ethics columns of our CSR table. These are
important aspects of CSR indeed.
The above characterizations however, are separate from recent work
moving toward the idea that it is possible that the investments described may
actually be maximizing present value of future cash flow without appearing to.
This would be as a result of accounting methods to transcribe this reality not
having yet been developed (Barnett 2007,) or from present value not being the
correct metric (Rowley and Berman 2000) from inaccurate operationalizations
(Orlitzky et al 2003) or too universal of an approach. (Mackey et al 2007)
These uncertainties mean that while some initiatives are engaged in even
though they do not add to the bottom line, others engaged in will be shown in
future, to have indeed added to the bottom line in ways not currently captured.
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It is here that the full benefit of the competitive advantages of CSR done
with a strategy will be felt, and felt long before metrics can capture it.
Niche market opportunities as well, will allow greater expansion in firms
that embrace and lead in the strategic conflict prevention subset of CSR that is the
focus of this work. These benefits, like all benefits of leadership, will accrue to
those who lead in this direction before the metrics tell you what already happened.

Future Metrics Will Capture Current Reality Better
B

Effectiveness

A

No
Point

Possible
if DoNo
Harm

Profit
Graph 1A

While the primary argument of this paper is in the “how to” category of
the debates around CSR and Corporate Social Change Agency – specifically in
the how to select tactical CSR initiatives category - we do offer an argument in
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the normative side of the debate. That argument is not, like the majority of the
literature under that debate heading (Barner 2007; Aguilera et al 2007; Griesse
2007; Beschorner 2007) summed up nicely above by Mackey et al (2007), an
ethical or legal imperative argument, that corporations should do socially
responsible initiatives even when those are not financially viable. That is indeed,
a very important set of questions and discussions.
Alternatively however, what we are arguing is that corporate behaviors
that are attentive and responsive to the setting in which they are engaged –
including the socio-politico components of that setting – may be financially viable
and further that those who lead in this direction will gain greater competitive
advantage faster than will those firms who do not. That is to say also that more of
those that seem to be initiatives engaged in because they are the right thing to do
will eventually show up as profitable as well, as soon as methods to show that
profitability are developed. The future methods, we say, will show more
initiatives of this nature to be in the “B” section of our graph (1B) – the upper
right hand quadrant and not where they currently are perceived to located, in the
“A” or upper left hand section.
The mechanism for gaining a part of this added profitability will be
conflict itself. Conflict represents unmet need. The private sector as a whole
benefits from greater information about unmet need(s) as a source for
development of new services and products to meet these needs. Attentiveness to
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conflict in situ presents then, a vast source of informational advantage over
competitors as well as opportunity for horizontal and vertical industry penetration.

Accompanying Shifts in the Accounting Literature

When we go to the current accounting literature, we find an interesting
new direction appearing in that research. This new direction parallels closely that
line of questioning in the CSR literature indicative of a need for more accurate
accounting metrics and methods. In four separate accounting articles published in
January, 2008, the primary metric indicative of superior performance is itself
questioned. Maximizing profit is questioned in two (Kolstad 2007; Alexander
2007) while the separate metric, maximization of shareholder value, is analyzed
in the third and fourth (McSweeney 2007; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2007)
Brendan McSweeney (2007) in his introduction to the issue of Accounting
Forum contributing to the debate on salience of stakeholder value maximization
as primary indicator of economic contribution, has these two points to make.
1. It is corporate retentions (not stock market transfers) that, along with
debt, are primary investment funding sources.
2. Irrationalities and imperfect information influence shareholder
valuation beyond performance.
The first of these important points indicates that the metric heretofore
considered primary for measuring corporate performance – shareholder value – is
22

not, in fact, directly tied to the creation of future business and wealth as a funding
source as previously thought. The second of the two points indicates that the fit
of shareholder value as a perfect representation of financial performance is
imperfect at best.
Illustrative of a similar disconnect between share value and tangible asset
value are these two data points from the U.S. for the time period 1989-1998
during which the former, shareholder value, increased by 262% and the latter
increased by only 14%. (McSweeney 2007) Tangible asset value is also less
useful as a representation of financial performance in service and knowledgebased economies.
The recent idea that Economic Value Added (EVA) management can act
as the pathway which would allow even minor business decisions to positively
impact shareholder value (Besanger, Mottis, Ponssard 2001) is not corroborated
by independent studies. The studies found instead a miniscule and often negative
correlation with shareholder value. Fernandez (2003) found positive
EVA/shareholder valuation correlation in only 18 of 582 firms and negative
correlation in 210.
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2007) make a different case, arguing instead that
while the dominant “business case” for CSR and social and environmental
accounting and reporting (SEAR) is that it promotes the voluntary pursuit of
stakeholder interests because it aligns with and enhances shareholder value, that
regulated pursuit can also serve to enhance corporate economic performance.
23

In yet another innovative approach to exploring the impact of factors on
corporate financial performance, Yu-Sahn Chen analyzed three categories of
“Green Capital,” one aspect of environmental CSR, assessing their effect on
corporate competitive advantage. His 2008 study indicates high correlation
between the two. The correlational effect is greater the larger the firm. It is these
sorts of financial recompense to firms which have been overlooked along with
costs to the equation’s other side, in the too-narrow pursuit of shareholder value
as preeminent corporate performance indicator. It is these sorts of innovative
metrics along with an expansion of the search for benefits that may be hidden that
will allow us first to more accurately measure corporate performance and then to
appropriately design CSR initiatives and make other decisions from the more
accurate data then available.
Moerman and van der Laan (2007) discuss the way in which accounting
methods can and have been used as rhetoric – as means to persuade, used for
effect – serving to obfuscate an ideological bias. Also discussed is the use of
public discourses by corporations to privilege certain interests. (Grant, Hardy,
Oswick, and Putnam 2005) Along this line of thinking, Kenneth Kury (2007)
assesses current accounting scandals as a ramification of financial earnings
management. Alternative to the agency theory approach singling out individual
financial managers, he takes a systemic institutional approach decrying the
earnings manipulation as an extension of culturally, regulatory, and normatively
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approved earnings management behaviors and as an unintended manifestation of
the institutional primacy of maximizing shareholder value.
Other authors debating shareholder value primacy include Newberry and
Robb 2008; Gray 2006a; Gray 2006b; and Tudway and Pascal 2006. Accounting
methods and metrics are, however, widely outside the scope of the present work.
This cursory look at current trends in accounting toward increased metric
accuracy is included only to further indicate the degree of uncertainty around
capturing financial performance. This uncertainty includes the possibility that
data from alternative future metrics will increase understanding of how current
CSR directions are improving financial performance.
This means that chasing the elusive shareholder value may not be the grail
which will be that “rising tide” that will lift all boats. The good news is that there
is a “tide” to which private sector actors can contribute which while not raising all
boats will raise more boats. It is creation of this tide which will be the overriding
strategy guiding the most financial successful CSR initiatives and their selection.

The Power of those who Interpret our Behavior and
One Category of Underrepresented Cost

When we look to the costs of initiatives and to the reasons that some of
those costs are underrepresented, we find that a valuable addition to the category
of costs contributing to the less than maximally successful performance of CSR
25

activities is articulated and illustrated well by the work of Farzad Rafi Kahn of
Lahore University. (2007)
His work on representational approaches offers an interesting map of the
thinking of individuals and groups prior to social initiatives. This map, here
including four path descriptors but alluding to many more, indicates how the
incorrect representation of reality can grossly affect the cost-determination
process and the accuracy of the cost and benefit data.
Intuitively, how we define issues affects our response choices. Less
intuitive though, is the reality that what we chose to include in our cost data, our
benefit data, and the amounts we choose to assign to each in our costdetermination process, also varies with paradigmatic definition of the issue.

(Rafi Kahn 2007)
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This is useful in indicating why many multiples of viewpoints each
describing the same situation, setting, and factors, must be considered when first,
costing, and then, selecting, project and policy options.
The forthcoming work of Basu and Palazzo (2008) also indicates an
understanding of an organization’s internal cognitive processing as factor in
engagement style with the world. Their term for this is an organization’s “SenseMaking Process,” such that internal character can predict external outcome of
CSR initiative. Much like Rafi Kahn’s representational systems, these sensemaking dimensions and accompanying typologies can allow for analysis of the
interrelationships between internal character and engagement strategy.
Research by both parties indicates that significant and costly errors in
behavior, including selection of CSR initiatives, can be made as a result either of
misinterpretation, mis-categorization of the reality unfolding before us.
Alternatively, this can be stated as resulting from an accurate representation that,
in deviating from another also accurate representation more salient to a
stakeholder group, creates costs in the interpretive deviation. What this means is
that those who interpret our behaviors have power we cannot afford to ignore.
Discussion of this important point – the power of the interpreter of behavior –
continues on page thirty-four with analysis of the social revolution studies of
Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) One of the most extensive and far-reaching
challenges involved in the prevention of conflict and in reducing related firm
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costs is the “…capacity to know about and correctly interpret events early…”
(emphasis mine. George and Holl 2000)
The war in Chechnya provides one of many examples of this dynamic at
work. It was “…based on a serious misjudgment,” (Lapidus 2000) which was the
result of misinterpretation. The misinterpretations behind the poor judgment were
of the Chechnyan political situation, “Russian military capabilities, and of public
opinion.” (Lapidus 2000) The misinterpretation resulted in “an exceedingly
costly policy that exacted an enormous toll.” (Lapidus 2000) These misjudgments
arising from representational and interpretive systems exact enormous tolls within
the private sector as well.
In the same way that governments have been making errors in
international relations strategies and foreign policy choices as a result of too
narrowly defined security goals (Rubin 2002) – derived from a too narrowly
defined concept of self-interest – private sector actors too, have made profit- and
investment-endangering choices arising from too narrowly defined goals and selfinterest conceptualizations.
The work of Henri Tajfel (1978, 1974, 1970) also underscores the
dramatic ramifications of a world view choice on the creation of goals. Tajfel’s
work showed clearly that stakeholder groups will first align themselves on the
most casual of differences – much like the stakeholders within a firm will see
other stakeholders as different from themselves – and will then, on that basis only,
choose outcomes that will maximally differentiate the groups. This means that
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groups will not only seek out differences over commonalities, they will then
choose outcomes that lead to less profit for themselves (1974) even in the
presence of the possibility of positive-sum outcomes. (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1975;
Tajfel 1970; Billig 1973; Billig and Tajfel 1973) It is important to note that we
are not referring to situations where trade-offs are required but where positivesum outcomes are overlooked because the paradigm, the lens of expectation, the
representational system, and the current accounting methods and metrics, blind us
to them. Competitive advantage goes to the firm that can pull off its blindfold
first, longest, and most completely. To do this, paradigms incorporating the
understanding that social concerns are firm concerns, that success of the firm is
entangled with and not competitive with other stakeholder success, must be
mainstreamed into corporate culture. Corporate culture is where the “SenseMaking Process” of Basu and Palazzo (2008) and the “Representational System”
of Rafi Khan that help us interpret reality live. Re-alignment of interpretive
systems of corporate culture comes through Level I of the Investment
Sustainability Toolkit and must precede selection of CSR strategies and tactics.
It is exactly this mindset in which positive-sum outcomes exist but are
invisible to our paradigmatic interpretation, that is holding back the full potential
of the private sector – and all other stakeholders who will have their boats lifted
as well when this new rising tide takes hold. The stakeholder groups to a setting –
public, private, civil society, and more – are one group, not many. They have one
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shared set of goals – the long-term profitable success of the group – not separate
goals at odds with each other.
In the same way that the review of CSR literature has shown a shift toward
debate of application and best practice, we too now move from this literature to a
conflict prevention literature discussion before shifting to application via case
study assessment.
Frameworks: Theory into Practice
In the work by Aguilera et al (2007) the authors refer to what they are
putting forth primarily as a description of the actors and motivations that push
organizations to act in a socially (ir)responsible manner. In their abstract, and
again in their conclusion however, they refer to their work as describing why
corporations engage in CSR. This change in phraseology seems to imply an
interchangeable relationship between the terms. Yet there is a difference between
the motives of the actors who lobby corporations and the corporations’ motives
for performing the requested actions. This divergence is significant.
They put forth an introductory framework, of some value in creating the
matrix into which additional data on firm motivation may be added. Additionally,
the analysis of four levels of actor and three categories of motivation allows for
more standardized cross-cultural comparison. Its value however, may remain
limited in that it assesses the motivations of those who lobby for greater corporate
responsibility without analysis of the motivations of the corporation.
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The corporate motivations created then, from the lobbying of these
pressure groups, can still be said to be motivations which do not include the
important self-interested understanding of the initiatives, the benefits to firm and
to financial performance, which we have been discussing.
In the next chapter, we will discuss the Conflict Prevention research
literature and will establish from there, an alternative framework. This multilevel framework will be of value to corporations, especially MNCs, in two ways.
The first is in the project assessment phase by allowing, through alteration
of the interpretive lens, hidden costs to be revealed. These are costs which would
otherwise decrease projects’ sustainability and cause less-than-maximally
successful projects to be approved and implemented. This will help to show how
initiatives are more accurately described as in the firm’s self-interest both
financially and other. This assessment portion of a project also will allow for
prevention behaviors or initiatives to be identified, without which projects that
would likely be profitable remain too risky and are not selected. This results in
costs to the firm in the category of opportunity cost. Money is left on the table so
to speak and in so being left, is sometimes detrimental both to the MNC and to the
developing nation indicated by the project proposal.
The second addition of value is in allowing for on-going dynamic
assessment to changing conditions in the social groups – including their
relationship to each other, to government, and to the firm – in the political
structure, in local and global economic factors, in the environment and
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importantly, in other factors along these and other dimensional lines not yet
indicated or understood to be effecting the sustainability and mutual-profitability
equation.
Framework thus will be valuable in:
1. Allowing projects to be selected that are truly maximally
successful,
2. Allowing projects that might otherwise not go forward to do so
based on successfully identified, low-cost initiatives to mitigate
and prevent conflict risk from manifesting,
3. Allowing for on-going mitigation of dynamic alterations to all
of the dimensions of the project’s sustainability – including
socio-politico-economic, environmental and importantly, as of
yet unidentified dimensions affecting outcome.
Business has a powerful role to play
A coalition of business leaders can:
1. Provide both the incentive and the techniques to enable groups to work
toward ending killing as was done by South African industrialists
And again by business leaders in El Salvador with the “Goods for
Guns” program. (Galama and Tongeren 2002)
3. Provide space
for dialoguing on specifics between divided groups, and
for talking about issues more generally among the populace.
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4. Link their social investment to larger development and conflict
concerns resulting in greater return value to firm.
5. Through microfinance and development cooperation assistance,
promote small- and mid-sized enterprises (SMEs.)
6. Create opportunities for reconciliation, re-humanization, and social
capital.

“…successful conflict prevention is also sound protection
of development investment.”
Annan 2002

The role of the corporate sector in Peacebuilding is still not widely
recognized or understood. The understanding that firms cannot excel on their
own, in isolation, and that far from being mutually exclusive, a response to
general local and regional concerns is also a response to a firm’s own needs, is
integral to the initiatives necessary to create the shift from zero-sum and fixed-pie
to mutual gain and a bigger pie with bigger slices for each.
In Chapter three, we will articulate, frame, and specify more of what is
understood in this field while going beyond to further conceptualize what are the
more likely directions for future learning.
We now turn to an analysis of the current research on conflict prevention
in Section II.
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SECTION II

RESEARCH REVIEW OF CONFLICT PREVENTION:

Making the Business Case: How Stabilization and
Prevention save Corporations Money
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“…unmet need creates grievance, grievance creates conflict, the process of
ascertaining those unmet needs…helps companies to locate profitable niche
markets that will be based on meeting those needs.”
Strategies for Social Responsibility 2008

“…BP rig managers who engaged in the community, listened to people, and took
their advice were on time and on budget.” “…doing good work in social
justice…is good business. We do it for business reasons.”
Renate 2002 – BP International policy advisor

“Caterpillar could not remain competitive as an ‘island of excellence,’…could not
grow in isolation; it needed infrastructure, good suppliers, well-trained workers,
and so on. …Once the company realized that the problems of the community
were also its problems, it was able to develop projects that addressed those issues
more directly.”
Griese 2007b

This is what the Investment Sustainability Toolkit will help firms with –
developing projects (tactics) that address the issues more directly, and
successfully, and to do so within the strategy of mainstreaming the realization that
the community’s problems are also the MNCs problems – and that in helping to
solve them, we are helping our financial performance.
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The preceding chapter ended with a discussion of a framework from
Aguilera et al (2007) for analysis at the level of motivations.
This chapter will now focus on the conflict prevention literature. From
this literature, it is hoped that we will be able to apply lessons learned in two and
a half decades of practice to CSR. By doing so, we will be able to help increase
efficiency at the tactical level of CSR while also more narrowly and more
accurately focusing the strategic level.
Jonathan Berman of Political and Economic Link Consulting (PELC)
determined in 1999 through interviewing key decision-makers overseeing
operations for multinational corporations in ten global armed conflict regions in a
variety of industries that “…every company wants stability in the region in which
their asset is located. The conflict prevention strategies that managers are most
likely to use are the ones that work by enhancing stability, or otherwise enhancing
the business environment.” (Berman 1999)
The framework of the Investment Sustainability Toolkit allows for a
starting point of awareness for multi-national corporations and for governments of
developing nations to which other scholars can offer additions. This starting point
begins with meeting the total cost set of doing business in a region and then is
centered around the multiple dimensions of that stability that Berman, (2000)
Caterpillar, and common sense tell us is what firms want and what doing one’s
fiduciary duty requires.
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At the top of the three layers of the Investment Sustainability Tool then, is
what is referred to as, the Primary Question. That Primary Question, at the apex
of the framework, is a point to which corporate team members can return again
and again as a reminder while working to mainstream into culture and cognitive
sensibility, a realignment of representational system.

Will this given CSR initiative
1. Link firm success with success of locale and other
stakeholders and, does it
2. Maximize mutual gain, viewing mutual self-interest
as best interest – Looking to increase combined
added-value total of all stakeholders ?

This question goes beyond meeting firm responsibilities and begins
creating opportunity to harvest competitive advantage. It is also the
representation of a strategy – one that bounds this segment of CSR while
increasing corporate security and financial return from the selected initiatives.
These questions function primarily to realign interpretation of decision
makers, and to continually remind all parties of this realignment rather than to
lead directly to definitive decisions.
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“Signs of imminent political crisis were abundant throughout the 1980s…”
Menkhaus and Ortmayer in Jentleson 2000

This quote above refers to the situation in Somalia in the 1980s. This
same type of statement can be made regarding the onset of all violence. There are
always indicators. It is these indicators that for the protection of their investment,
profits, and personnel, firms must not ignore or leave to state actors alone. These
indicators, in being listened to and addressed, offer opportunity.
Before continuing with description of tactics which can address these
indicators even prior to their identification – tactics discussed and implemented
through the second and third layers of the Investment Sustainability Tool, we will
take a brief look at costs and at lessons learned.

The Costs of Conflict
“For legal business activity, conflict is bad for business.”
(Killick and Gunduz 2005)

It takes only a simple, quick look at GDP data before and after civil war –
a figure that drops as much as fifty to sixty percent a year in conflict (Sambanis;
Collier 2003; Maltz 2006) – to glean the most single, telling piece of data that will
ever be available to reflect the greatest business cost of conflict: the cost of the
growth that didn’t happen as well as declines in business that may have also
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occurred. It is only the boundary definition of GDP that relates to the state. The
actual losses represented by a decrease in that number, are not borne by the state
but by the organizations generating domestic product; the composite private
sector.
That percentage represents an overall loss of growth – an opportunity cost.
Also lost to business, during civil war, is a percentage of GDP that now goes to
military expenditures. (Ghadar 2006; Collier 2003) The total percentage of GDP
going to military defense goes up (from 2.5-5%,) (Collier 2003) taking funds
away from infrastructure development, transport networks and other marketexpanding projects. Also decreased are funds going to education and job creation.
This combination decreases both markets and employment, each of which then
also contribute negative impact on the money multiplier effect, all three then
negatively affecting wealth spread specifically, as well as economic growth more
generally.
Wealth Spread is defined as “…the scope for an industrial development
approach to spread economic opportunities and therefore enhance social
inclusiveness...” (Bredel 2003) Wealth pooling and economic exclusion are the
opposite of wealth spreading. Spreading wealth created from original investment
is a more socially sustainable practice than original investment alone. One
example of a wealth spread initiative is cooperating with a local higher education
establishment to allow those trained by initial project to market those skills
further, to additional markets.
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The overall result then, from this investment, growth, and wealth spread
that does not occur, is a minimum of 2% permanent loss in GDP. (Knight) This
does not yet consider the potential for outbreak of violence that is escalated by the
absence of wealth spread activities.
The effects of these results are certainly felt by each firm within the
private sector. As a percentage, results may impact smaller firms more than
larger firms, however, as an absolute number, larger firms experience larger
impact as a result of their larger investments and percentages of markets. They
are, however, also felt in the area of good will. When the economy is doing well
overall, citizens may see each firm in a more positive light. When the economy is
falling, markets are not expanding, and wealth is pooling instead of spreading,
citizens will view each firm more negatively as compared to their view of the
same firm in a growing economy and even, at times, as the cause of their misery.
Though the losses from diversion of resources from production to
destruction concurrent with civil war are spoken of in terms of a double loss –
what they are not producing, and again, the damage they inflict (Collier et al
1999) it is actually more accurate to speak in terms of a triple loss because of the
loss of the geometric increase or multiplier effect that results from a path of
production building upon itself.
Collier et al (1999) found that incomes drop by 15% as a result of civil
war, resulting in a poverty increase of 30% and a 60% loss on the year’s GDP. In
addition to being bad for creating markets, poverty is also one of the “Common
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Elements” of conflict identified by a variety of scholars. The “Common
Elements” are the mid-level piece of the Investment Sustainability Tool between
Level I, the Primary Question, and level III, Specifics: The Screening Checklist.
These common elements will be discussed in greater depth beginning on page 75
of this text.
Stewart, Huang, and Wang’s 2001 survey indicated a -3.3% average
annual growth rate for the 14 countries affected by civil war whose data could be
completely calculated. Many macroeconomic indicators worsened during the
conflict. At least 12 of the eighteen countries able to be partially analyzed were
affected in each of the following measurable ways: decrease in per capita income,
drop in food production, external debt increased, and export growth declined.
The unrealized growth as well as the perennial percentage of unrealized
gain on that growth, are opportunity costs of violence that need to be included in
the decision making cost/benefit analysis of particular activities and policies
which may either escalate conflict or alternatively, work toward conflict
prevention. The inclusion of this metric may lead in part to an improvement in
the overall capacity to capture accurate cost data for CSR initiatives.

Other Costs Beyond Immediate Loss:

Unrealized Gain
Annual percentage increase on Unrealized Gain
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Investor confidence decreases
Fuel cost increases
Cost of Capital increases
Critical Industry destabilization
Consumer Confidence decreases
Market destruction
Market creation inhibitions
Trade

(Bilateral trade is depressed by violent conflict or
terrorism by up to 6%) (Ghadar 2006)

Colletta and Cullen (2000) analyzed the relationship between violent
conflict and the transformation of social capital using four case studies:
Cambodia, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Somalia. In response to heightened
opportunism and uncertainty, people invest less and retreat into those subsistence
activities that are less vulnerable. For example, in Uganda during the long period
of social chaos the share of the subsistence sector increased from 20% of GDP to
36%.
“…war is an economic and social disaster for the affected country.
Therefore, for those who care about development, civil war is a major problem.”
(Collier 2003; emphasis mine.) While the words “care about” can connote a
moral directive, replace those words with “interested in” and the meaning remains
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constant while the directive becomes more obviously, one of intense self-interest
for corporations – those most interested in economic development.
Because we know that those most affected by civil unrest are not the
active combatants (Collier 2003) but other stakeholders including the private
sector and because those negative ramifications reach out regionally, globally, and
far into the future (Collier 2003), letting tensions escalate to violence becomes far
more than heartless – a morally based argument – it becomes also foolish – a selfinterest based argument.
The many guidelines published since 1997 by regional or global
development organizations which encourage a conflict prevention lens for the
private sector, have encouraged this lens, not in the best interest of other
stakeholders but in the best interest of the private sector participants themselves.
(OECD’s DAC, UN, EU, World Bank, CIDA, SIDA, DGIS, DFID) What has
been their conclusion with every study behind the guideline? There is no
development without peace, no peace without development. “Conflict prevention
and sustainable, equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities.”
(Annan 2002)

UNIDO – the United Nation’s Industrial Development Organization - is
one arm of the United Nations. It is the arm which, of all the international
organizations working with conflict, most focuses on business and industry
development. Within their literature and practice, an evolutionary shift is seen
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toward prevention from post-conflict reconstruction. The reason? Cost to
industry.
UNIDO, as the industrial development arm of the UN has interesting
contributions to make under the auspices of Ralf Bredel (2003) regarding the
MNC’s ability to encourage both political decentralization and economic
integration and to assist in technical and other cooperation in the strengthening of
small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs.)
Peacekeeping Generations
Pre-‘89

1990s

Post-‘90s

A means for preventing nuclear war
Reconstructing conflict prone countries with the aid
of UN development agencies.
Conceptualizes genuine long-term conflict prevention
Table data from Bredel 2003

“In particular, the strategic separation of peace-building and long-term
conflict prevention leads to the argument that former bounds, which
assigned development cooperation a limited role mainly in the process of
reconstructing states, are outdated. Development entities inside the UN
system are now held to view humanitarian and development work through
a conflict prevention lens and make long-term conflict prevention a key
focus of their work… A new generation of development projects
specifically focused on conflict prevention … is avowed.”
(Bredel 2003)
On this conflict prevention evolution, it is in the best interest of MNCs to
follow the lead of that agency most focused on business enterprise. Stability –
political, social, economic – is good for business. Participating in the creation and
maintenance of stability protects both one’s investment and the long-term profit
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stream that can lead from it. Avoiding conflict-prone areas altogether creates
significant opportunity costs. Opportunities for profit are left behind for risks
that, with few, low-cost initiatives, could easily be mitigated.
Private sector actors will lose as much or more at the advent of
destabilization as any other actor in situ. The composite of private sector actors
represent, except in extreme cases, the major source of investment in a setting.
So, while no one firm is required to or holds sole ownership responsibility for
aiding stabilization or helping to prevent destabilization, it is the composite
private sector that will, as largest investor, suffer the greatest investment losses at
the advent of destabilization.

Natural Resources Industry Costs

There are three reasons – all addressable – that natural resource export
businesses are considered a likely contributing factor to civil war even when done
in a conflict-sensitive manner. A World Bank study of 52 major civil wars
confirmed that neither ethnic nor religious diversity were predictive of civil war
and that such risk spiked upward significantly in the presence of poverty, a
downward moving economy, or a dependence on natural resource exports.
The first is because it contributes to wealth pooling instead of wealth
spread – a few get much richer than everyone else. This is easy to address and
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involves the sorts of trainings, micro-credit and market development programs,
we will discuss in Section III.
The second reason is indirect and is due to its role as transitional gateway
through which an agriculture-based economy must travel to become service-based
(IBRD 2005; Oxfam 2001; Ross 2001; International Alert ) itself already a tricky
economic road of transition to navigate.
The third reason is also indirect – through global supply chains (Killick,
Gunduz 2005) and, as these improve (see pg. 111) so too will we see this factor
decrease the degree of correlation between natural resource extraction and civil
war.
Since civil war is also in large part the progenitor of the spread of AIDS,
“hard” drugs and international terrorism (World Bank) then we see that the true
cost of natural resource export businesses may in fact, be staggering. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC,) with all three WB risk factors present,
has a civil war risk of 80%. The argument might therefore be reasonably made
then, were a party so inclined, that these staggering costs of natural resource
harvesting – currently borne by societies – might rightfully belong to the
extractive industry, to be passed on as costs in the product price.

46

The Cost Escalation Without Prevention and Preconciliation

With conflict, a rubicon is crossed. Going back is harder than not having
gone forward. Also increased is the human “fodder” available to those who
would co-opt citizens for other agendas. Here again, decreasing the co-optability
of the displaced, disillusioned, and disenfranchised is harder than were it never
created. Revenge and retribution also add to the tension, escalating the situation
to an altered and more challenging state. (Jentleson 2000b) Prevention is the only
way. The most promising, and least costly, opportunities are always at the
beginning, and usually prior to the flaring of tensions. Preconciliation is a term
we have developed to capture that reality. Preconciliation - reconciliation events
and efforts before the fact – are the new resolution efforts.
Let us now turn to a few examples of prevention and preconciliation from
the private sector engaged in developing nations. These examples illustrate how
firms, mainstreaming conflict prevention, have chosen a broader more accurate
definition of self-interest before then choosing collaboration as a mindset and then
from there, engaging in stabilizing, successful initiatives.

Successful Positive-Sum Outcome Examples
Caterpillar Tractor in Brazil
The Caterpillar Tractor Company successfully contributed to regional
development in Piracicaba, Brazil, and to their own sustainable, long-term profit
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stream protection. CSR scholar, Margaret Ann Griese summed up the reality on
the ground succinctly, “Once the company realized that the problems of the
community were also its problems, it was able to develop projects that addressed
those issues more directly.” (2007b)
Beginning with factory construction in 1973 and operations in 1976,
Caterpillar Brazil became a participant in the socio-economic situation of
Piracicaba, Brazil. In 1993, they consolidated their Brazilian operations in
Piracicaba. Throughout that time, the firms’ definition of and feel for, community
involvement changed as their concept of social responsibility expanded. (Griese
2007b) The firm began with a “Peaceful Coexistence” strategy, moving to
include environmental responsibility in 1996 with a program of “Sustainable
Forest Management” (Caterpillar 2002).
Through 2000, Caterpillar also had extensive life and health benefits for
its 2575 employees, supported cultural events and philanthropic organizations
locally, and sponsored a children’s meal and after-school program.
Despite all this as well as thousands more jobs created through suppliers
and dealers, Caterpillar decided in 2000 to move their CSR activities to a new
level. Community Development became their strategic new focus and they
launched, “Our Future, Today,” which the locals immediately dubbed, Piracicaba
2010. The reason for this new shift however, is significant and telling.
“Caterpillar,” the firm’s management said, “could not remain competitive as an
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‘island of excellence,’ …could not grow in isolation; it needed infrastructure,
good suppliers, well-trained workers, and so on.” (Griese 2007b)
One aspect of Our Future, Today was the gathering together by
Caterpillar, of 33 private sector, university, and civil representatives for the
process of initial strategy development. The group added six additional
representatives from all parties, as a way to assure that the process would not
become politicized. (Griesse 2007b) They then added a one thousand member
City Council Group encompassing residents and all 400 local associations. In this
way, the project became a city-wide movement. (Griesse 2007b)
The project includes nineteen target areas including education, industry,
tourism, environment and culture. (Caterpillar 2004) After the group was formed,
they created three future scenarios of their city. They followed this with
assessment of strengths and weaknesses of each. Questionnaires were then
circulated, local experts consulted, and public debates held to determine a vision
which then resulted in a second round of debates and effort to develop specific
strategies and tactics. (Mourao 2001)
A website, journal, meetings across the city, a children’s art contest, a
book, a conference, and working groups were all then created to fulfill three
goals: spread the word, elicit input, and to implement the micro-projects.
Caterpillar contributed expertise, financial support and hours of work from top
employees to the project which was hailed as the best thing to happen to the city
in decades. (Mourao 2001)
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In the coming years of implementation however, challenges surfaced in
the form of slow-moving committees, city hall bottlenecks, and the departure of
experts. There are, as always, those who, incented by personal gain, subvert the
process to their own ends. Some wondered if Caterpillar officials and employees
were among these, seeking publicity, and a “big show” from which they would
then quietly retreat. Indeed, there was no mention of Piracicaba in either
Caterpillar’s 2006 Annual Report or in their 2006 Sustainability Report and as
early as 2004 there was only a single mention of the project in the Annual Report.
While the project may have earned mention in the firm’s Portuguese language
reports, it would be of value to Caterpillar to include an update in the English
language reports regardless of the success of the project as compared to their
original goals. This way, their commitment to an on-going project would not only
be readily apparent, but the update would serve to undermine those who would
claim less than sincere or enduring participation of Caterpillar because indeed,
this absence could reflect modesty rather than a lack of commitment. The annual
analysis could also reveal important lessons for increasing cost-effectiveness of
future interventions.
Many of the projects are in fact, developing, although, slowly, while
others remain stymied for lack of city and state funding for ongoing operation.
Additionally, positive results include on-going cooperation among the small
working groups developed through the project on implementation of additional
pieces, the original multi-sector cooperation in arriving at a city vision, and the
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investment by subsequent large and medium sized actors in the setting. Despite
falling short of the hoped-for target, much value was added to both Caterpillar and
Piracicaba as a result of this coordinated, collaborative development project.

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan’s large oil and gas reserves and the successes there provide an
illustrative example of the potential available through positive-sum collaboration.
It is particularly useful and representational due to the high degree of opportunity
for both business and foreign direct investment represented by the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union.
With an inventory, in 1997, of fourteen national and regional factors for
conflict registering at the “high” level (Christie 2000) Azerbaijan was poised to
become a “Norway or a Niger Delta.” (Banfield 2004) Through implementation
of a five phase tripartite dialogue for action at corporate, local, industry, host
government, and geo-strategic levels (Christie 2000), the picture has been far
better than it would have been without long-term, strategic, partnership style
involvement of all stakeholders including, and led by, the private sector.
Azerbaijan is the petro-state with the largest gas field discovery since
1978 in their Shah Deniz field. Production from their large oil reserves is
expected to peak at 1.5M bbl/day in 2010. Their location creates a situation in
which Russia, the U.S., Iran, and the European Union all vie for influence while
more than ten of the world’s largest oil multinationals also vie for influence and
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resources. It is also a fragile and unstable state. For these reasons, a discussion
group at the Business and Peace conference in May of 2000 concluded that the
overlap of interests could best be addressed through a tripartite dialogue. (Rienstra
2004)
The Four Phase project that the dialogue group came up with began with
Phase I – a year of identifying the challenges and risks. Sectoral, corporate,
government, civil, and NGO representatives participated. Phase II saw the
identification of key players and the bringing together of these players in two
meetings which led to Phase III in which an Economic Development Committee
(EDC) was created to define solutions to the identified challenges – among which
was the broadening of the economic base out beyond the support offered by the
oil industry. The banking sector too was included at this level as were local
entrepreneurs to “develop local supply industries” (Champain) This Committee is
also trying to help cut through the corruption that oil companies are somewhat
protected from but which their local supplier businesses must contend with.
These local suppliers also do not have access to secure bank loans.
The EDC developed working groups. These working groups each focus
on a single target. Among these targets are included the development of a
database to match oil company needs with local company services, trainings to
increase local capacity, policy analysis to change laws toward aiding local
business, and governmental and public communication about the EDC. Phase IV
is the process of institutionalizing these and other mechanisms decided upon to
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address the challenges, including institutionalizing the EDC. An additional piece
of this phase is to write up the lessons learned for the benefit of future such
cooperative projects elsewhere. (International Alert)
Simultaneously, through a coordinated project such as this one in
Azerbaijan, civil society is being strengthened through NGO dialogue with the
international business community. In this case specifically, the presence of the
international business community also strengthened and increased legitimacy of
local NGOs such that they then, in turn, received greater funding and could assist
with refugees and internally displaced persons more successfully. (Champain)

BP in Colombia and in Azerbaijan
One of those transnational oil firms working in Azerbaijan was British
Petroleum. In the first two to three years in the region, BP invested $14 Billion
dollars US. Understanding the challenges before the country as listed above, BP
chose to work extensively with NGOs. Their representative there, Andreas
Penate – BP International Policy Advisor - says they work with NGOs in the
region because the NGOs, “were doing a good job.” (Penate 2002) BP also was a
key team member of the EDC.
BP learned much as well from their experience in Colombia. What
happened with their production there – some oil rigs were profitable, others were
not – is not an uncommon experience for business anywhere in the world. What
they discovered upon closer inspection is that those rig managers who, “engaged
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in the community, listened to people, and took their advice were on time and on
budget.” (Penate 2002) BP also began developing partnerships with NGOs that
were doing good work in social justice or environmental performance because
that, he says, “is good business. We do it for business reasons.” (Penate 2002)
…delivering mutual advantage for local communities and BP is one of
our primary business goals…” BP official (2006) speaking on community
enterprise
(Nwankwo et al 2007)
Working in Umid, with the one hundred and fifty formerly displaced
families living there, BP support has helped to create the Human Development
and Sustainable Income Generation Public Union, or UHDU – Azerbaijan’s very
first community-based organization. The program began with the training of
Umid women to make work gloves and has grown to include now-successful
efforts toward legal recognition and a unique social structure as well as work
opportunities.
Since that beginning, the product range has also increased, to thirty
products, and, due to high-quality products and service, the client base has grown
both locally and internationally and income has increased from $24,300 USD to
$120,000 USD. The program employed thirty-four residents by the end of 2006.
BP’s representative is quoted as saying that they “feel they are helping the
families of Umid to build a brighter future for themselves,” and are achieving this
with what they refer to as “a small financial investment from BP Azerbaijan and
its co-venturers.” (BP 2008)
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Shell, Levi Strauss – corporate culture redirection
Shell, in working past some of their less favorable experiences of the past,
has changed their corporate culture toward this same, broad-minded yet still selfinterested direction. Their new slogan, “People and profits – is there a choice?”
clearly reflects this mindset. (Shell 2007)
Mo Rajan, Levi Strauss Labor and Human Rights director, is also succinct
regarding their new direction and their self-interested reasons for it, “Damage
control is a hell of a lot more expensive than doing the right thing in the first
place.” When Levi Strauss had facilities in Burma, they were one of the first
major U.S. corporations to pull out of that country after the ruling regime began
its most recent atrocities. Both of the factories contracted to Levi Strauss at that
time were connected to the military regime. In so pulling away from those
factories, Levi Strauss became, and continues to be, a model for the interaction of
human rights and business.

Chiquita in Costa Rica
In cooperation with the Rainforest Alliance, Chiquita has developed the
Nature and Community Project, based at their Nogal farm in the Sarapiqui region
of northeastern Costa Rica. (Chiquita 2006) This project combines environmental
conservation, biodiversity restoration, education, and economic development.
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Five small businesses, contributing to many families in the region, have
been developed thus far in the areas of ecotourism, crafts and art products around
environmental protection as part of this project’s first pillar. Their environmental
education programs and workshops run through the Chiquita Nogal project center
have reached 3,000 visitors including area schoolchildren, neighbors and
employees as part of the second pillar.
Through the third pillar of this project, Chiquita is helping to restore
native species toward maintaining biodiversity. The project has involved
replanting of 10,000 trees of 40 native species. It is through cooperation with
local farmers that the land is made available – from the farmers – to be reforested
with trees - from Chiquita. (Chiquita 2006) A second important piece of this
pillar of the project is the creation of a biological corridor. This began in January
2006 when 250 acres of protected rainforest on Chiquita’s Nogal farm were
designated a private wildlife refuge. As a response to this, it was Chiquita’s
decision to “facilitate the migration and survival of endangered species.”
(Chiquita 2006) This they contributed to by connecting their acreage, through a
biological corridor, with other forest areas in the region, including the Braulio
Carrillo national park 5 miles away. (Chiquita 2006)

Colombia
Faltas and Paes (2005) dramatically illustrate the potential of the private
sector for creating the kind of rising tide that truly does lift all boats. They depict
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how demilitarized combatants in Colombia and in Mozambique used market
forces to create the results the combatants had formerly sought through violent
social revolution. Though these are not projects initiated by the private sector,
private sector actors participate and importantly, there are lessons to be learned
for the private sector.
In Colombia, demilitarized rebels soldiers facing hostility from former
comrades and learning that no one wanted to employ them, consulted experts and
then, with the aid of European governments, found their own way by establishing
the for-profit corporation, Nuevo Arco Iris (New Rainbow.) (Faltas and Paes
2005) Its mission was,in part, a determination to support economic, social, and
cultural rights for all and giving priority attention to those affected by poverty.
They also sought to create conditions favorable to enabling all regions and social
sectors to reach markets both national and international.
The work of those two hundred employed, of whom 115 were former
combatants, increases social cohesion, teaches conflict resolution, engages in
microfinance, supports agricultural business sustenance for the improvement of
public services and builds trust in all strata of society for the reintegrated rebels.
The corporation’s commitment to promoting public/private alliances that increase
disposable resources toward further investment has increased social order. In
addition, it has offered crop substitution possibilities to coca farmers, selfemployment projects for poor women throughout the country and, in seeking to
combine business and peace to improve Colombian society, has tested and proven
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the viability of the School for Democracy, Peace, and Tolerance in the province
of Sucre.
This school allows over eighty aspiring agrarians, demobilized fighters,
and community leaders to gain exposure to economic development education,
environmental and ethics training, politics, culture, leadership and alternative
dispute resolution.
This all began because of a belief that the market can do what social
revolution cannot and that the market does not now but can create wealth which,
say the executives of New Rainbow, is good for the people in the long run. Like
any private sector business, New Rainbow’s board of directors understands that it
must be competitive, play in accordance with market forces and offer services
people want. Each of these efforts offers valuable insight to others in the private
sector willing to listen. It is not necessary to wait until after the outbreak of
violence, each of these items could have been accomplished just as well and, most
often, better, if engaged in prior to onset of violence. Indeed, according to their
chief executive, one of the major hurdles to be overcome by New Rainbow was in
fact the need to create both trust and a space for themselves in society because of
their former participation in violence. (Sanguino 2005) Success would have
proceeded sooner were this their initial engagement project and not one secondary
to efforts at violent social change.
Other, non-combatant, private sector actors can gain superior benefits and
cost reductions by similar engagements. They can also create and maintain
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campaigns of awareness helping civil actors at all levels to better understand the
costs and benefits involved with the two options available to them – violent social
change or non-violent, market-driven, social change.
A highly stratified society fed the growth of left-wing insurgents in
Colombia (Faltas and Paes 2005.) In fact, disequilibrium, disopportunity, and
excessive inequality within stratified society are the leading cause of social revolt
according to separate work by each of three leading scholars in social revolution.
(Skocpol 1979; Gurr 1970; Moore 1966.)
Gurr (1970) states the reality as follows:
Political violence occurs when many people in society become
angry,… when there occurs a gap between the valued things and
opportunities they feel entitled to and the things and opportunities
they actually get – a condition known as “relative deprivation.”
Scholars also supporting the argument of a systems/value consensus theory
– explaining social revolutions as responses to severe disequilibrium in social
systems – include Chalmers Johnson, Talcott Parsons, Anthony Wallace, Neil
Smelser, and Edward Tiryakian.

Mozambique
In Mozambique, The TAE – Transformacao de Armas em Enxadas or
Transforming Arms into Ploughshares – has, since 1995, been working to
incorporate that salient reality into all their projects. What is important for all
private sector actors to understand is that it is not only important which projects
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go forward but also what cognitive explanations underlie those choices.. In this
case, it was a valuable insight to incorporate wealth spread and social equality
enhancement into aspects of every project no matter how far removed from such
they may seem. This we see from the inclusion by scholars, of those two factors
as precipitating destabilization.
TAE’s stated mission is to support artists by first collecting weapons
(small arms and light weapons) and then having artists transform them into works
of beauty (Forquilha 2005). TAE expands the benefits of their mission by
incorporating their mainstreamed cognitive understanding that social equity is at
the root of a culture of peace and economic development. This incorporation is
reflected in what they give in return for the collected weapons – by the sorts of
“useful tools” they, by covenant, exchange for the weapons. It is this exchange
process that brings art and weapons, two things that may seem at first blush, far
removed from economic development, equity, or social improvement, squarely
into that path – with effects that have been surprisingly far-reaching.
One woman for instance, received a sewing machine in exchange for her
collected weapons. This is a choice directly established from the underlying
mainstreamed cognitive belief that social improvement will stem from
opportunity and access. She launched a successful business and now employs
eight other people. (Forquilha 2005) In this way, it was made possible for her
efforts to extend the opportunity and access created from a single sewing
machine. With it the multiplier effect assists in the further geometric impact on
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the economy and the creation of just that sort of “rising tide” that does indeed
ripple outward to all boats. In other examples, a young man received cement to
rebuild his home, a university student was given books and the injured received
bicycles to aid in getting to and from clinics. (Forquilha 2005)
The project’s success has been a direct result of the strong partnership and
trust built among the chief players and key sectors – public, private, civic, and
rebel.
MNCs can participate both by adapting these programs and programs like
them to the needs of their particular setting. A second, perhaps even more
valuable way to participate is through the beliefs underlying the tactics. The
above tactical choices were described as being “…directly established from the
underlying mainstreamed cognitive belief that social improvement will stem from
opportunity and access.” By embracing this idea and mainstreaming it into
corporate culture as the strategy through which tactical-level initiatives are
chosen, MNCs can participate in ways that are more successful for themselves as
well as for the particular initiatives recommended through the strategy put forth in
this paper.

Inaction
It is difficult to argue in any conclusive way that any given particular inaction resulted in a conflict’s escalation to violence. However, efforts at
prevention have been shown to create space, opportunities, support, transparency,
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and strengthened inhibitions against violence. (Lapidus, 2000) Any of these alone
intervenes in the escalation process, potentially creating affects which then slow
and or stop the escalation.
An additional route to building support and a business case for efforts to
strengthen local and regional stability examines the high costs of not trying these
routes. Inexpensive methods of preventing these costs and of simultaneously
protecting investment would then increase in the benefit column in equal and
inverse proportion to the associated costs of failure or of not trying. Providing
voice, grievance pathways, participation, and opportunity are all among the
aforementioned set of inexpensive stability strengthening initiatives.
It seems challenging for instance, to state conclusively that in-action led to
September 11th. However, isolationist policy that allowed for dismissive response
to the seemingly remote and distant descent of Afghanistan into a failed state
allowed “a small extremist group to stage the most devastating attack ever on U.S.
soil.” (Rubin 2002)
Conservative estimates put the cost of that day at $105 Billion US.
(Ghadar 2006) But that is only including the cost to the U.S. itself and then it is
only immediate damages. Not accounted for in that number is the build up of
recruitment strength of the small extremist group subsequent to the destruction,
the future impact of that greater recruitment, consumer confidence decreases, or
critical industry destabilization. This one of the costs of inaction alone, stemming
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from a misunderstanding of interdependency dynamics, surpassed the combined
GDP of the world’s poorest 50 nations.
Each of the above short program descriptions includes lessons learned
from a second discipline; that of economic developement. Much has been learned
and improved upon in the field of development economics in the last thirty years
and in what we refer to here as Socially Sustainable Economic Development. We
would be protected at less than the level currently available to us then, if we were
to leave economic development lessons learned out of the analysis. Our new
Venn diagram therefore, looks like this with the area at the focus of this paper
represented by the triangle highlighted at its center:
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For a more in-depth look at examples of potential postitive-sum,
collaborative, stabilizing initiatives, please see Section IV – The Toolkit in
Liberia.
Since 1945, the U.S. economy has experienced annual GDP per capita
growth of 3.5 %. Japan however, over the same timeframe, experienced a GDP
per capita growth rate of 20%. This illustrates two important realities. The first is
that one’s successes only seem successful until one looks at what was the full
extent of what was possible. And the second is that the cost of not growing to that
fullest extent possible is a cost that should be included in the decisions that
prevented it – in this case, in part, the military expenditures associated with the
arms race. The actual cost then, of this policy choice, was not just what was paid
but also must include what was not earned. In this way, private sector decisions
and the cognitive models underlying them must include as well, an understanding
that each of their decisions carries a cost – the costs associated with the ways in
which it limited growth. Success itself, must be defined not by the reality that
some profit was earned but instead, by the full understanding behind the more
salient question, “did a greater profit remain hidden behind what appeared like
success?”
A $2000 initiative to open channels of communication for instance, may
look like an expense but, if it creates a $10,000 increase in sales, then not doing it
does not represent a $2000 savings, it represents an $8000 loss. A year end profit
of $20 Million USD for instance, may also look like a profit but if getting there
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prevented a $200 Million USD profit then couldn’t it as easily be depicted as a
$180 Million USD cost – an opportunity cost?

Why Firms Become Targets

In his 1966 work, Barrington Moore, Jr, a noted Harvard sociologist
focused on paths of social change, asserts that, “indeed it is an historical
commonplace that improvement in the economic situation of the (citizens) may be
a prelude to revolt, may seem to crater our thesis and indeed may seem to contraindicate his own thesis of objective exploitation. It in fact not only supports both
but also explains why firms who feel they are improving the quality of life of
those around them are often targets of negative sentiment. This is because what is
critical is not the absolute but the relationship between the two, or several, parties.
As Moore goes on to explain, the relationship can become more exploitative
“even if their material situation improves.” Indeed, especially if the situation of
the firm is seen to improve while the negative impact on the citizens is perceived
to increase and/or the firms’ positive contribution (private sector actors
individually or as a whole) is seen to decrease. “A decline in the …contribution
along with general economic improvement and efforts … to increase the ‘take,’
could be expected to generate tremendous resentment.” (Moore 1966)
This is invaluable insight into why, as stated earlier, those who interpret
our behaviors have power.
65

Moore’s thesis, as applied to private sector actors is that their
contributions (positive) must be obvious to the citizens – and the citizens’ “return
payments,” (here the perceived negative impact upon them) must not be grossly
out of proportion to the services received. That is, folk conceptions of justice do
have a “rational and realistic basis and arrangements that depart from this basis
are likely to need deception and force” (Moore 1966) to maintain them or are
destined otherwise to failure.
These then are the lines in both directions along which citizen or popular
perception creates power. Any firm whose Sense-Making Process or
Representational System leaves them blind to a cost (negative impact) that the
citizenry perceives itself as experiencing, is creating and then germinating the
seeds of its own destruction and the loss of its own investment, profit-stream, and
growth opportunities.
As Skocpol (1979) reminds us, it is pressing to include a structural
perspective within one’s assessment. Recent revolutionary crises have come
about, she concludes, through inter- and intra-national structural contradiction.
Mainstreaming then, a cognitive reality that incorporates the dimensions of social
consistency discussed here – relative equity, opportunity, access, participation –
within all private sector projects would seem then a sensible and self-serving,
indeed self-preserving, contribution to dampening revolutionary crises and
increasing the several dimensions of stabilization – to one’s own profit.
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The terms stabilization and de-stabilization, as here referring to locales
and not industries, are meant to be comprehensive - encompassing any form of
either, and including social, economic, and political, at a minimum.
The 2001 Guidelines from the OECD’s DAC branch entitled, Helping
Prevent Violent Conflict, recommends private sector contribution to the offsetting
of negative impacts on structural stability from the effects of its investments.
Given the above, we can see how and why this can be an important contribution
to successful, stable long-term profit streams for a firm. However, to fully protect
oneself, firm’s investment, and its long-term profit stream, the private sector
council must go further – to contribute beyond negative offset to positive impact
on structural and strategic stabilization of locale and its region.
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SECTION III

The Investment Sustainability Tool
Levels I, II and III:
Level I – Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention into Corporate Culture
Level II – Common Elements
Level III – Specifics: The Screening Checklist
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OVERVIEW
Investment Sustainability Toolkit - Three Levels
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I have shown how working toward increases in shareholder value,
currently considered to be a firm’s primary fiduciary duty, may not be the best –
the most complete – goal to represent what is in a firm’s self-interest. There may
be other metrics better suited to representation of this if thought of as the
maximization of total profit over the life of the company.
Further I have discussed that the accounting community is already moving
in the direction of creating other metrics that more accurately represent
cost/benefit realities, aligning the empirical evidence with the benchmarks
measuring it.
Lastly, I have illustrated the enormous cost to the private sector of destabilization and violence in lost investment and profits. And we have shown
through example how a wider view of self-interest mainstreamed into corporate
culture and manifested in contributions to stabilization can protect investment and
increase markets, demand, and profit-streams.

That brings us to Level I of the Investment Sustainability Toolkit. Level I
is the Primary Question Level. This is the level that allows for us to have a
question to which we may always return when vetting, designing, or
implementing a given initiative. This is the level of Mainstreaming; where the
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idea of conflict prevention is incorporated directly into the fabric of the company,
permeating its culture.

Level I: The Primary Question

Will this CSR initiative:

1. Link firm success with success of
locale and other stakeholders
and, does it

2. Maximize mutual gain, viewing
mutual self-interest as best
interest – Looking to increase
combined added-value totals of all
stakeholders?
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This question can help us to incorporate our broader view of self-interest
into our actions, including in that wider lens more of the costs that would
otherwise remain hidden until far later in the process.
While this is not yet the level of the toolkit that is designed for indication
of specific prescriptions, the question, the mainstreaming, and the strategy they
represent lead to two general tactical suggestions. Despite their generality, they
are the two most valuable guidelines beyond the primary directive to mainstream
prevention into corporate culture.

Create Private Sector Council
Acting alone even in initiatives that do not appear, initially, to warrant
controversy, can create excessive vulnerabilities for any single actor acting alone,
from any sector. Killick and Gunduz in their two joint efforts in 2005 refer to the
initial reluctance to positively influence the decisions or communication of actors
to a conflict. This reluctance, he says, can be generated from the power that
governments exercise over businesses. An additional source of potential exposure
arises from non-governmental social groupings that may misinterpret or otherwise
have grievance with the actions of the corporation.
Creating a Private Sector Council is one way to circumvent these
vulnerabilities of unilateral interaction and still allow for valuable engagement to
proceed. Coordinating representatives of firms from the artisanal level to the
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multinational for the purposes of discussing private sector challenges, selecing a
response and directing implementation of the selected action is an option that both
diffuses exposure while, importantly, adding the legitimacy of consensus. In this
way, a council over unilateralism allows a weakness to become a strength.
Involving representatives from civil society where available, and from a wide
variety of demographics where civil society is not yet available, can allow for
additional legitimacy, as well as for the transfer of knowledge and input, while
also creating one more pathway for social voice.

Engage a Strategic Stabilization Director
The Carnegie Commission’s Preventive Diplomacy Conference advises
the U.S. military to adapt to preventive tasks through use of new technology as
well as through preventive systems and processes.
Thinking in terms of creating a favorably preventive environment – such
that pathways exist to handle and resolve conflict non-violently when it does arise
– is critical as a shift from thinking in terms of mitigating conflict after it has
already surfaced or worse, containing violence after it has already broken out.
In order to do so as an MNC, engaging a Strategic Stabilization Director to
apply the Investment Sustainability Toolkit and oversee selection and
implementation of initiatives from it is of value. Just as firms benefit from having
mining engineers overseeing drill site development and accountants to utilize
tools available to him or her as CFO, a firm would also benefit from a
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professional, with a specific skill set, to oversee usage of The Investment
Sustainability Toolkit as well.
Having realized the cost benefit of hiring such a professional, the next
question regards the skill set combinations this professional ought to have. Skill
sets such as economic development, wealth spread, pro-poor growth, dialogue
process development, political organizing (Griesse 2007b,) conflict dynamics and
risk assessment are among those of significant value. It was a critical factor in the
limitations on success of Caterpillar in Piricicaba that the firm’s expertise was in
strategic planning and not in any of the aforementioned skill sets. Had they hired
a strategic stabilization director skilled in these areas, broader, more dynamic
success would likely have been the outcome. (Griesse 2007b.)
The skill set then that is valuable to look for in a strategic stabilization
director to coordinate the private sector in situ, coordinate that sector with the
civil, NGO, and local representative sectors, and then develop and implement
sustainable, wealth-spreading economic development initiatives all under the
guidance of the Investment Sustainability Toolkit, should include a combination
of the following expertise:
Economic Development,
Dialogue Process Development,
Political Organizing,

Mediation, Negotiation, Collaboration,
Political risk assessment,
Conflict Dynamics ans assessment.

“Giving to local charities … often runs into the problem that
local charities lack sufficient capacity to manage the project
and have no way to sustain the project in the long-term. Managing projects in-house, on the other hand, solves the problem…”
(Nwankwo et al 2007)
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Let us now turn to greater levels of detail in both Levels II and III of the
Investment Sustainability Tool.

Level II: Common Elements of Conflict

In adding the second and third layers to the initial, Primary Question, layer
of our Investment Sustainability Tool, we move first to “Common Elements of
Conflict.”
These points making up Level Two, are indicated from a variety of research
sources, and are to be borne in mind prior to and indirectly generating, the third
layer Specifics: The Screening Checklist. They can be thought of as overriding
points to mainstream into the corporate culture defined by the Primary Question.
Once understood, it might help to think of these elements in terms of a
couple of category headings for the initiatives that come from them. For thinking
in those terms, Losses That Look Like Wins and Key Areas for Stabilization are
two very useful, broad headings that can be easily remembered. In our upcoming
case study review of Liberia, low prices for land and other resource inputs to
business are an example of the former, while stabilizing a locale’s staple food
price (not all food prices, the staple food price) for instance, would be an example
of the latter.
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The result is an umbrella-shaped hierarchy to the Toolkit which looks like
this:
1. Primary Question,
2. Common Elements to Mainstream into Corporate Culture
(Losses That Look Like Wins AND Key Areas for Stabilization)
3. And, Specifics: The Screening Checklist

Or like this,

Common Conflict and Resolution elements:
Level Two then begins with a look at two categories of common elements.
The first are those factors common to conflicts which resolve non-violently while
the second looks at elements common to those conflicts which escalate to
violence.
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I.

Elements Found to Be Common to Conflict that Resolves:
Regular dialogue (Abad 2004)
The development of norms and principles (Abad 2004)
Comprehensive cooperation (Abad 2004)
Leadership (Carnegie 1999)
Social cohesion,
Concerted international engagement, and
Accommodation of diversity

We will refer to these seven, collectively, as Preconciliation.

II.

Elements Found to Be Common to Conflict that Becomes Violent:
Suppression of differences (Carnegie 1997)
Distribution of socio-economic
resources (Busumtwi-Sam 2002)
Relative Deprivation (Vanneman 1972; Walker
1994; Gurr 1970; Pettigrew 1998)
Low income (Collier 2007)
Slow growth (Collier 2007)
Primary commodity dependence (Collier 2007)

In light of the data suggesting that violence can be avoided in the presence
of the first set of factors or that it will be the likely result in the presence of the
second set of factors, initiatives to address these offer a considerable likelihood of
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substantial return – in the form of protection of start up and on-going facility
investment. It is here that we find a likelihood of success that indicates a goforward cost/benefit ratio.
These should not exist in a vacuum however, but be added to the already
mainstreamed ideas of human resources such as:
1. Efforts to reduce absenteeism or increase productivity
2. Efforts to increase opportunities offered to employees
While these two concepts manifest differently in developing country
settings, they should not be overlooked. These too, as elsewhere, work to reduce
conflict while also increasing productivity. In the developing world, they might
look like the provision of water, sanitation, malaria nets, immunizations, vitamins,
aids medications for employees’ family members – to keep the employee
available to productivity - and oral rehydration therapy which by keeping
employees’ children healthier, increases employee productivity.
The second might look like additional trainings in all forms from
leadership and management to vocational programs, from small business
education to primary or secondary education. An additional form which might be
taken by the effort to provide more opportunity is the provision of technology or
other adaptation which leads to a decrease in physical labor and/or time
commitment.
To this we would add community opportunity, making trainings available
to community members as well as to employees. The reason for this is that
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relative deprivation, a result of wealth pooling, is also shown to cause both
grievance and violence. (Vanneman 1972; Walker 1994; Gurr 1970; Pettigrew
1998) This indicates that anything that can be done to increase wealth spread
beyond job creation, is also a valuable protector of corporate investment.

Forming the “Elements” into Level Two
Taking a look at the second set of factors, those present in conflicts which
become violent, we can consider the first – Suppression of Differences – to be
addressed via initiatives already accounted for through the first of the two factor
sets. Let us label that first of the two factor sets, with the term, Preconciliation.
And now, let us label also, the remaining factor from the second set with the term,
Economy-related. Adding in the aforementioned two elements already common
to human resources, we thus have our four primary common elements which we
can mainstream into corporate culture along with the primary question.

They are as follows:

Preconciliation (The 7 above-listed factors)
Economy-related (3 items)
Absenteeism
Employee and Community Opportunity

From this mainstreaming and useful categorization, we can then also use
this framework of factor categories to more strategically select our specific
initiative prescriptions. Initiative selection is narrowed through these two sections
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of the tool based on the strategy of level I. In this way, we ensure that initiatives
make sense to our investment protection through accurately aimed prevention of
violence.
A word about ethnicity. These prescriptions to be described below allow
for the prevention of the co-option and mobilization of ethnic groups as political
movements or conflict actors. There exists a debate among scholars as to the role
of ethnicity in conflict. On one side of the debate spectrum is the idea that
ethnicity is a primary cause of violent conflict while at the other end of the
spectrum is the idea that ethnicity is co-opted as a mobilizing foci for conflict
which was created more primarily by resource and power scarcity. (Lund 2004)
We need not enter this debate, which is itself outside the scope of this thesis, in
order to see the value in addressing both roles ethnicity may play. To this end,
many of the prescriptions described below will either increase the spread of
benefits of economic development or increase the pathways for dialogue and for
non-violent resolution towards the goal of addressing both possible roles.
Let us now turn to look at Level III: Specifics: The Screening Checklist.

Level III: Specifics: The Screening Checklist

We will discuss each specific prescription in terms of the Common
Element to which it is ascribed. We will then include the specific factor, if any, it
is intended to address. Before beginning however, let us make two points that
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pertain more to the full, comprehensive program of combined specific
prescriptions than they do to any one prescription.
The first of the two items is the note that programs to develop strategic
stabilization and conflict prevention along the four lines indicated here can benefit
from including the following dimensions:
1. Be Cross-Border, transnational and regional in scope,
2. Be Cross-Sectoral and include all private sector industries, International
NGOs, governments, MNCs, civil society groups, and local business
including mid-, small-, and artisan businesses.
3. Be Cross-Disciplinary and Multi-Dimensional instead of single issue.
Not education first and then economic development for instance but both,
and all, relevant processes developing simultaneously with a wider focus
than comes from a single discipline specialization.
It should be noted that this last aspect to policy - that they be crossdiscipline - represents a significant challenge to the
bureaucratic structure and one that forces us to address and
modify that structure to allow for greatest policy success.

The second of the two items is a new and important connection between
prevention and the needs of business that comes to us from an understanding
of conflict:
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PERCEIVE ALL GRIEVANCES AS
NICHE MARKETS REVEALED

Creating conflicts won’t help the bottom line. So our belief that every
conflict is a new niche market revealed is not suggesting that firms create
conflicts or violence. Rather what is meant by this is the understanding that a
conflict, almost any conflict, or any grievance, stems from an unmet need(s.)
Further what is meant is that the process of ascertaining what those unmet needs
are that have created grievance, helps companies to locate profitable niche
markets that will be based on meeting those needs. Business is always looking
for ways to better understand the needs of its clients and potential clients.
Conflict is the manifestation of unmet need and as such, engaging in the process
of deconstructing it or getting to the core issues, allows firms the opportunity to
better develop products or services to meet those needs.
This is just one of several aspects of the “opportunity” – as opposed to
“responsibility” - available to us from social responsibility strategies that look to
alter the angle of perspective and to involve a firm’s chosen tactical projects in the
stabilization of the locale.

Infrastructure and civil society building, key components of
Preconciliation, are closely tied to and intertwined with those items under the
category heading Economy-Related. Those items in turn, along with
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infrastructure, are tightly corresponded to items under the heading Employee and
Community Opportunity. It is also fair to say that the prescriptions with
Absenteeism underlie all of the other three. For these reasons, the prescriptions
cannot be wholly separated along neat lines into only one category. As a result,
the reader may see items in one category for which a case could be made for its
inclusion elsewhere. We have tried to be as clear as possible in the
categorizations while understanding overlap. Where reiteration of one
overlapping topic is deemed of significant importance under a second category
heading, we have tried to be brief in re-reference to that prescription item in its
second iteration.
With that, we turn to the first of our Common Elements prescription
categories.

Preconciliation
What is “Preconciliation?”
Understanding preconciliation begins with an understanding of
reconciliation. Chip Hauss, Director of Policy and Research at Search for
Common Ground USA, refers to reconciliation as a new idea. As editor of a book
on conflict published in 1995, he saw no mention of the word whereas as editor
again in 2001, it was, “the most frequently cited concept.” (Hauss 2008) Included
among the idea which remains without a standard definition among scholars, are
the ideas of rehumanization of the other, intergroup contact theory (Pettigrew and
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Tropp 2006; Pettigrew 1998) building bridges and connections between groups –
be they adversarial or simply co-existing groups, and building trust. Hauss
suggests that it is a means through which to “change the way that individuals
think about” and here he says, “traditional adversaries.” (2008) Hizkias Assefa,
in his chapter on reconciliation in People Building Peace II, refers also to the
process of restoring relationship. (2005)
However, reconciliation may be used also to increase tolerance more
generally, altering the way that people and groups feel not only about their
adversaries but about other people and groups despite the absence of adversarial
relations. This is reflected in Assefa’s definition when he includes reference to
future relationship. (2005, p.637.) Future relationship is improved, even when it
is not yet negative, by the same opportunities to talk openly and learn from
members of other groups. In this way, other groups and their members become
known as individuals, become more humanized in our minds, and it becomes
harder for others to come along then and dehumanize them to create a scapegoat
or address a hidden agenda. (Pettigrew 1998)
By the coining of the term, Preconciliation, we mean here to take these
concepts of healing and strengthening relationships and focus them directly on the
latter usage and on its expansion. We have changed the re- to pre- in order to
suggest both their usage prior to violence and preferably, prior to conflict and to
at the same time suggest the mainstreaming of this concept. In this way, strong
relationship can be created rather than restored such that while groups are not at
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odds their extensive similarities and shared humanity are reiterated and
reinforced.
The second valuable benefit to preconciliation is in the institutionalization
of intergroup dialogue. Many mediation efforts in conflict situations struggle to
create dialogue, forums for dialogue, the working out of ground rules and the
beginning of scheduling meetings for dialogue on a regular and consistent basis,
only at the height of tensions. By establishing space, procedural ground rules, and
regularly scheduled communication, in less tense times, and between many
different demographics at all levels, the same communication pathways that
created greater understanding between people and groups toward the prevention
of conflict between them will then be available still, in times of tension. These
constructed communication pathways then serve the dual purpose in times of
tension, of institutionalized grievance pathway that can act as alternative to
violence as a source for resolution.

Develop Routine Interorganizational Coordination for Prevention
In addition to the Private Sector Council to allow for the discussion and
representation of business needs through a less-threatening mechanism than
unilateral action, dialogue between private industry, the public sector, many
representatives of civil society, and NGOs is valuable as well. (OECD 2001;
Carnegie Commission 1999) The value of this dialogue is both direct and indirect
through the dialogue’s goal of spreading economic development and its benefits.
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The private sector can contribute in this dialogue. Greater contribution
can be brought through the important provision of a forum for the dialogue.
(OECD 2001) Through the provision of the space for dialogue to occur, the
ground rules or common principles of engagement can then be established.
Routine meetings – monthly, twice monthly, more frequently when needed –
consistent even in the absence of specific conflict or grievance, then allows for the
growth of rapport, comfort, and understanding between groups to exist. In this
way a pathway for the airing of grievances is developed. Extensive knowledge of
the existence of this pathway allows for valuable information to be gained, for
needs to be unearthed prior to impact upon them, and for grievances to be aired
early on in their development cycle. The dialogue and roundtable space must be
safe physically while also feeling safe or comfortable in other ways. It must be
open both to exploration through questioning and to the many alternative solution
suggestions that exploration will offer. It must be cooperation- or collaborationfocused. The dialogue process will also need ground rules. These should include
an explicit effort to do the following. (Fisher and Ury 1981)
Separate the people from the problem,
Separate the interests from the positions,
Brainstorm collaboratively, and
Select options, from those brainstormed, based upon objective criteria.
Dialogue processes doing so will experience the highest levels of safety, comfort,
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collaboration, reconciliation, success, and reduced intergroup bias (Pettigrew
1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006):
Expanding alternative avenues of diplomacy – a conflict prevention effort
also strongly recommended by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict – has the added benefit of helping us to address our nontraditional
security threats. Firms cannot afford to overlook situations of injustice that may
not seem, traditionally, as if they could lead to escalated conflict and violence.
“The costs of nontraditional security threats can be as devastating for human
beings as those of traditional security threats, and they generally have the
potential to escalate into conflict and war.” (Schnabel 2004) Therefore, having
avenues of diplomacy or Institutionalized, Inclusive Grievance Pathways (IIGPs)
at all levels opened and maintained can be one of the least expensive – around
$2700 on average (Galama and Tongeren 2002) – means for prevention available
to the private sector.
Think “Firebreaks” to Violence
In his summary to the 1999 Conference on Preventive Diplomacy,
William Zartman (1999) talks in terms of skill sets and approaches. One of these
approaches to preventing conflict he labels, “Think Firebreaks to Conflict.” He
includes in this category, both substantive and procedural firebreaks. Substantive
such as preventing discrimination, repression, constitutional abrogation; and
procedural such as momentum breaking breathing spells. Through slight
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alteration of this approach to Think Firebreaks to Violence, we allow for two
important and interconnected tactical pathways to be generated.
The first is that we allow firms to harvest, through regular preconciliation
dialogue, the valuable data that conflict generates at the level of disagreement.
This is especially as regards to unmet needs in the community which can then be
met through either an entrepreneurial division of the MNC or a local entrepreneur
sponsored by the MNC. This allows for the creation of niche markets around the
harvested data of unmet community needs while spreading wealth creation and
the benefits of economic development. In this way, firms are able to switch
thinking from responsibility, to opportunity. This is an important new concept we
can take into business from our knowledge of conflict and of business.
Second, we then also allow for firebreaks such as the aforementioned
forum, to be put into place that will help conflict to lead to and create constructive
results while remaining outside of the cost-intensive path of violence.
Zartman mentions standards, reports, principled assurances, and
designations by supranational organizations as examples of firebreaks to conflict.
We include here, a few additional others as we alter the thought framework to that
of Firebreaks to Violence (and not necessarily conflict.)

Awareness Campaigns
Normative expectations are a common element of a favorably preventive
environment (Abad 2004.) Normative expectations can be illuminated through
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the process of social norming – the process of applying marketing concepts to
social and health issues by promoting positive norms practiced by the majority of
a group. (Asch 1951; Sherif 1972) A simple, inexpensive survey to capture
norms regarding non-violent resolution of conflict and grievances will give data
that can then be highlighted through an awareness marketing campaign. Posters,
art contests, bill boards, and the like, are specifics to be included within a social
norming awareness campaign.
Other awareness campaigns might include the following as needed, broken
down into campaigns internal to the people of the region and those external, to an
international community.
A. Internal to nation
1. To promote leadership, governance, and social cohesion.
2. To help create understanding of co-option, [identity-salient
“nationalism” rhetoric,] divide and conquer strategies, and that
war is “primarily an instrument of politics in the hands of
willful leaders…Intrastate violence is the result of deliberate
action by determined leaders” (Carnegie 1997) “Conflict
entrepreneurs manipulate socially constructed identities.”
(Busumtwi-Sam 2002)
This is a way to promote the knowledge that people’s
grievances can be, and often are, co-opted, causing them to be
used for personal gain and other agendas. Awareness
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campaigns can also, in addition to alerting populations to the
negatives of one pathway, increase awareness of the positive
possibilities of another. Consecutive campaigns then, can
make populations aware of the greater potential of non-violent
alternatives for gaining social justice – and the benefits nonviolent response will engender for them in socio-economic gain
and within the international community.
3. To The Business Sector - Publicizing the costs of potential
violence to the business sector as the center of a campaign to
also strengthen the bonds of the common socio-economic goals
of the business community.

B. External awareness campaigns
1. To build the awareness of the international community in
preparation for potentially necessary engagement of that
community or its components.
2. “Naming and Shaming.” This is one of the most commonly
used instruments for altering abusive behaviors by groups at all
levels of authority. (Weinstein 2007, 344.) This initiative uses
publicity, norms, and reputation to change behavior of groups
internal to the nation by making witnesses of external
observers. To do this, a firm begins by alerting members of the
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external press to the internal behavior that would financially
benefit them to see altered. This is best done in the form of
anonymous tips.

Preconciliation, Reconciliation, and Rapport building events
In addition to having forums for dialogue and processes in place for
decision making, dialogue, and input, these are specific events and initiatives to
consider sponsorship and development of. They are designed to promote greater
social cohesion.
Re-humanization events with high intergroup contact. (Pettigrew 1998)
Civil society organizations that allow for or indirectly require high
intergroup contact, (Pettigrew 1998)
Sporting events at all levels from youth to international. At the youth
levels, these can create opportunities for re-humanization through
intergroup contact. At the international level, sporting events create
commonalities and, therefore, opportunities for cohesion to form.
Art and drama contests locally, regionally. Art with a theme of nonviolence or peaceful resolution of conflict can generate social norming as
described above. Also generates commonalities as do sporting events.
Civil Society Building
We also refer to the programs to address this piece as Process
Infrastructure Development programs. This is because this piece allows for the
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development of societal infrastructure capable of providing the process or
pathways for airing and addressing grievances of all kinds. Developing the
infrastructure for the process is as valuable as is developing a roadway
infrastructure for transmitting goods to market. Without Process Infrastructure
social change has only the path of violence available to it. Non-violent social
change cannot occur if the process for non-violent social change does not exist.
These processes, at all levels of civil society and government, must be
institutionalized – consistent, known, and transparent – as well as inclusive and
can be thought of as, Institutionalized, Inclusive Grievance Pathways (IIGPs.)
Developing these paths require the re-humanizing, intergroup events as in the
previous discussion, as well as the supporting events, initiatives, and concepts
from the list below:
Include Dialogue space, process, and routine – schedule meetings regularly
even in local and national settings that would not be considered conflicted. This
can be thought of as a type of Knowledge Management and is referred to as a
Knowledge Community. (Thomas, Kellogg, Erickson 2001) These informal talks
seek to alter each side’s perception of the other and to create a positive
atmosphere for addressing future issues of substance rather than to focus on a
search for a specific conclusion to any conflict (Zartman 2006; Fisher 2006;
Saunders 1999; Stein 1993.)
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Incorporate traditional processes such as the poetry of nomadic Somalis and
the restorative justice circles of the Maori or oral storytelling. (Harris 2006;
Estrella and Forinash 2007)
Civil Society - commonality groups and multi-ethnic, multi-community civic
groups that monitor governance and have free media to report to.
Free Media (Davison 2007; Coyne, Leeson 2004)
Incorporate those whose opinions differ from the status quo.
While work must be done with some of the most militant
dissidents to de-escalate and redirect the method for seeking grievance redress, it
is beneficial to success that less militant dissenters be included as stakeholders at
the table where their opinions and legitimate concerns can add to the strength of
any agreement, prescription, or initiative. Left out of the process, it is these
unheard legitimate grievances and their bearers who will alternatively become the
spoiler groups wreaking havoc on agreements to which they – and their
viewpoints - have not been well represented.

The preceding list of specific events, initiatives, and concepts can help
support the success of both conflict prevention and economic development,
increasing sustainability of the originating initiative. In this way, we see that a
network of supporting, intersecting initiatives is necessary for sustainabity. One
initiative, by itself, is rarely fully successful – or sustainable.
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We move now from discussion of Preconciliation initiatives to those
coming under the Economy-Related heading.
Economy-Related

Technology Transfer
Technology enhancements offer the greatest improvement to per worker
rates of productivity. (Solow 1957; Collier 2007; Easterly 2001; Brandt 1980)
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow has shown that after an initial facility investment,
additional investment has diminishing returns in adding to worker productivity,
eventually decreasing productivity. Contrary to the long accepted Harrod-Domar
model of investment, Capital Fundamentalism, which accentuates capital
infusion, it is adaptation that has been proven to be the primary force of value
creation in investment return.
Two critical pieces to the theory that technological adaptation increases
productivity and, as a result, increases economic growth faster than does capital
investment were reconfirmed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) with a third
being reconfirmed by King and Rebelo (1991, 1994).
The one caveat we would hold out in the adaptation theory, is timing. The
theory assumes a model in which workers can move to other jobs – meaning they
can gain re-education or re-training in a relatively rapid way. The Luddites of the
early eighteen hundreds indicated this by pointing out that though the incomes of
those who remain employed (should) go up because per worker output went up,
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those skilled only in the old technology – knitting lace and hosiery in the case of
the Luddites – will become unemployed. Many firms and unemployment
agencies in developed nations make efforts to address this employment shift
ramification of technological adaptations through short re-training programs of
six to twelve months. Therefore, the timing of when in the business cycle and
where within the transition of the overall economy (agricultural to service to
knowledge-based) the adaptation comes, is relevant to its value.

Protection of staple food price window
In countries where there exists a staple food, one that accounts for a
majority of the caloric intake for a majority of citizens – cassava in much of South
America, rice in Tamilnadu and in Liberia, tapioca in the Congo – fluctuations in
its price can lead to a “nontraditional” (Schnabel 2004) source of insecurity.
Scarcity and/or price surges can create a “triggering” event catalyzing present
social tensions. This combination of tensions and trigger occurred in Liberia in
1979 in what has become known as the “Rice Massacre.”
There are three ways firms could assist in preventing this catalyzing
trigger. The first is through direct project assistance and indirect policy influence
on increasing food independence of the staple crop. The second, protection of
food minimums, is discussed further under that heading within the EconomyRelated category. The third way is through ensuring the presence of a simple
borrowing and repayment system that stabilizes the price of staple foods which
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must be imported, to the enduser. In this way, cyclical and non-cyclical
fluctuations in the price of the staple food occur without notice by the enduser.
This is best attempted by a coalition of the private sector. The items
within the screening checklist are not designed for firms to engage in individually
per se and this is an even more important feature of the design when the
engagement is at the country level as this one is. However, should the
challenging situation arise in which not even one other small, artisanal, mid- or
large-sized firm be willing and available to act in concert with, stabilizing staple
crop price through a fund such as is described on page 131, should be engaged in
unilaterally bearing in mind that unilateralism is not the first choice but the last.

Work to aid infrastructure that aids exporters – ports, other transit
Even if the port is in a neighboring country.
A. Support for a region’s ports even when they are not in the immediate
country in which you are engaged in business is a valuable means for
decreasing private sector cost to export. Decreased cost to export
increases the size of the private sector while decreasing the barriers to
entry for supplier firms, thus enabling wealth spread through greater
access to business opportunity on the part of small and medium-sized
firms. This aids the regional economic development and thus
stabilization, creating more options for the neighboring landlocked
countries. The success of the coastal countries will itself also impact
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the landlocked countries in addition to the positive, direct impacts the
port will make on them. (Collier 2007, p121) Further work to
decrease other costs to exporters, directly or through indirect policy
influence, offers additional avenues to wealth spread and mitigation of
the nontraditional security threat of wealth pooling. Proactive
encouragement and support for the improvement of transport through
grants to support specific proposals from governmental agencies as
well as from local and International NGOs will increase infrastructure
for market access and supply cost reduction.
B. Payments for natural resources must be fair – as perceived by those
considering themselves the resources’ owners (the populace.) There
are two reasons for this. The first goal such payments must meet is to
allow the citizens of the host country to legitimately feel they are
receiving just compensation for the resources of their nation. See the
section on return payments and folk conceptions of justice, page 65.
The results of that research remind us that private sector contributions
(positive) must be obvious to the citizens and that citizens’ “return
payments” – here the perceived negative impact upon them – must not
be grossly out of proportion to the services received. In this way we
move the power of those who interpret our behaviors in positive
directions.
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The second goal of these payments is to ensure that a the people
are the end beneficiaries of the payments. It is important that a part of
the goal of the firm for these payments be that they will contribute to
increasing the conditions that will allow for wealth to spread and
socially sustainable economic development to proceed. This sort of
majority-centric, pro-poor economic development requires
infrastructure – both for political pluralism and economic.
As Willy Brandt, Commissioner to the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues, and former West German chancellor put it,
“Fair contracts are more stable.” (1980)

Mobilizing Changes in Trade Policy
Development agencies and the lobbies for such don’t necessarily
understand the vagaries – or their impacts – of trade nor do those issues stand out
as of great appeal to the publics of those groups. (Collier 2007, p187) As a result,
this creates, in trade policy, an arena in which the private sector can contribute a
significant and perhaps singular advancement – if done with the long-term lens of
broad, enlightened, mutual self-interest that will allow for profit-stream and
investment protections.
It is because of the reality that what is really in our long-term best interest
looks different when viewed through more accurate lenses, that the
implementation of this particular effort could look counterintuitive. Protectionist
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trade policies can feel very comforting to businesses. They are however, not in
the long-term interest of wealthy nations or of the firms that make up those
economies. As a result, self-interested firms will be lobbying and working against
some protectionist trade policy at home. Protectionism is counterproductive to
capitalism once the capitalist economy has succeeded beyond the fledgling level
and has transitioned into a service economy. For this reason, what looks selfinterested in the short-term (protectionism) is counterproductive to long-term, and
more profitable, self-interested choices. The investment climate quality including
the macro-trade framework focused on manufacturing export promotion policies
is indicated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as the
leading factor in contributing to pro-poor, sustainable economic development –
that form of development that increases sustainability by enhancing the capacity
of poor people to experience benefits of economic growth. (IBRD 2005)

Focus on Economic Inclusion (and Mobility)
The private sector can be very effective in their role contributing to
stability when they make this factor in conflict a key focus. This is because of
their capacity to have impact on economic development, employment creation,
and wealth spread as well as wealth creation. (Rienstra 2004) See further
discussion under Wealth Spread, and Pro-Poor Growth under the Employee and
Community Opportunity heading.
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Individual inclusion in social mobility is a must to the avoidance of
dissent. Categorical denial of mobility – the exclusion of particular social groups
from opportunity and grievance pathways – increases the dissent geometrically as
compared to randomly attributed dis-opportunity. (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Forgas
1981)

Employment Regime
GDP growth and income equality, as discussed above, are critical
variables in prevention of conflict. Employment regimes, described below, may
be equally so. (UNIDO) Stewart’s Matrix of Politico-Economic Differentiation
among Groups (Bredel 2003,) indicates that the following will be valuable to
monitor and balance.
Local Workforce
Percentage of local owned businesses within small, medium, and large
firm categories.
Percentage of local workforce at each level – money multiplier
effects cannot be felt when a high percentage of wages paid
is repatriated, leaving the country. Developed skill is another asset
that leaves the country when the non-local worker returns
home.
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Improving comparative advantage and regional economic complementarity
Regional Economic Unions
These items offer low levels of opportunity for direct involvement for a
private sector coalition but offer significant areas for both monitoring and for
having indirect influence upon.
Increase the complementarity of economies within a region.
Complementarity of economies is the degree to which two neighboring
countries or country within a close geographic region make what the other needs
and need what the other makes. Japan and China exhibit the highest level of
complementarity of economies in the world. (Kwan 2003) They do not both
produce the same goods. African economies on the other hand, exhibit the
world’s lowest level of complementarity producing largely the same goods and
services as all their neighbors – leaving them each needing nothing from the other
or able to offer anything to the other.
Instigate IFI (International Financial Institution) cooperative
venture incentives,
Offer incentives to reduce cross-border costs (financial and other)
to suppliers and markets.
Open borders – migration, travel, cross-border employment
increase success when barriers are low.
Offer influence toward creating a highly convertible currency
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If sanctions are to be used, use only with incentives and with civil
society engagement and use only financial sanctions not
trade sanctions.
Banking system improvements in transparency, and capacity,
Investment and capital access improvements (microcredits and
grants are two examples)
Movement
Assembly Activities
Aid in and offer influence toward movement from simple assembly
activities to efforts to increase the availability of technologically more complex
activities.
After an initial spurt of growths gained from simple assembly
activities, developing economies left to free market rules often
slow down, if no policy intervention for technological upgrading is
undertaken.
(Bredel 2003)
Socio-Economic
Additionally, efforts toward increases to individual social and economic
movement or mobility will decrease the need to turn to group mobility
demands. (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Forgas 1981)

From UNIDO
The Strategy on Conflict Prevention and Industrial Development
developed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

102

includes three target areas. It is wise for any private sector coalition to keep a
monitor on each of these target areas in their investment settings.
1. Economic Decentralization
2. Economic Integration, both horizontally and vertically. With
institutional and political participation, where members consider themselves
stakeholders.
3. Push-Centered and Pull-Centered models. The agricultural sector
pushes job creation in the first model. It does so at the beginning and ends of
agricultural production chains. Surplus labor pushes demand for off-farm jobs
while surplus crops and demand for technological change create agro-processing
industries at the end of the chain and supplier industries at the beginning. (Bredel
2003) The second of the two models refers to the pull from the labor-intensity of
rural industries toward the restructuring of this employment sector. The labor
intensity contributes to a multiplier effect from the rising income for rural nonagricultural workers creating increased demand for non-agricultural goods and
services.

The following summarizes the new growth theory premises linking
economic growth to improved living conditions. Our reason for examining it is
because it clearly indicates several places where inputs to increasing economic
growth are possible. Each input represents a potential intervention. Those that
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are most readily available to a private sector coalition have been marked in green
text.

Poor living conditions ← Low Work Productivity ← Low Capital Stock per
Capita ← Low capital supply (LCS) and from low capital demand (LCD)
LCS ← lack of consumptive ability ← low income/capita AND scarcity of
functioning capital markets
LCD ← Low ROI ← small market size ← low capital demand / capita
← insufficient entrepreneurial activity
(Aresin 1985)
As the flowchart clearly shows, improvement to living conditions, access
to capital, and access to entrepreneurial mentorship will have significant impact
on individual worker productivity as well as on larger growth of the local
economy – in turn increasing the earning power of the MNC.

Absenteeism
Food minimums (see also staple food price under Economy-Related)
The food minimums question can be thought of in terms of both total food
availability and in terms of availability of the primary or staple food. Both
availability issues can affect productivity even before the situation reaches the
level of crisis. Ensuring a minimum level of caloric daily intake per worker - that
it is available and affordable – will be felt positively through productivity
increases.
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Both situations however, can also lead to the larger losses related not to
productivity but to violent conflict and therefore warrant monitoring as well, as an
early warning indicator of potential violence onset.

Water and Water Provision
The water question has three parts to it: water minimums, water quality
and water delivery.
Water minimums. Soft and hard paths (demand and supply) should both be
used. Hard path or supply management approach focuses on how to deliver more
water whereas Soft path or demand management approach focuses on decreasing
demand through reducing waste. (Wolff and Gleick 2002) Two key methods of
the Soft path are drip irrigation and crop selection. Drip irrigation should be used
in settings where flood irrigation is used. Crop selection consideration should
include thought toward water inputs per yield.
Water quality. Delivery of potable water for prevention of water-borne
illness.
Water delivery. System infrastructure and Capacity. While the delivery of
potable water to a populace is important in its own right, for the value to good
health that it brings directly, we are interested as well, in an indirect benefit. The
presence of the system infrastructure as well as the decision making capacity in a
government to be able to provide water delivery have been shown to be an
important first indicator of the capacity for economic development.
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Each of the three can impact productivity directly and through conflict.
Water delivery absences in a setting where it was previously successful, is an
early warning indicator of conflict and of an opportunity to intervene successfully
prior to violence. Developing a capacity for immediate response to observed
decreases in the delivery, or capacity for delivery, of basic services is an
important preventive mechanism to have in place prior to the decreases.
Participation in and coordination of work to increase the strength of institutions
delivering services and otherwise assisting in the allocation and distribution of
resources to those outside of direct access to state power and its apparatus, is
valuable. This is because it is these groups, the majority of the population, who
will become marginalized in the absence of institutions to provide services and
resource access. (OECD 2001 p88)

Health
These following key health points are the combined set of lowest
cost/highest productivity impact intervention points available to a private sector
coalition. As such, they represent the lowest cost means for decreasing
absenteeism. In this way, these items most represent opportunity for the firm to
increase financial performance with the least investment.
Sanitation,
Malaria nets,
Immunizations,
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Vitamins,
AIDS medications,
Oral rehydration therapy.
Though cost goes up some by providing the above list to all community
members instead of solely to employees, both productivity and conflict prevention
benefit is strengthened through reduction of contagions. In settings where
multiple layers of inter-related kinship is the norm, productivity benefit is
additionally strengthened through illness reduction to employee kin. Proactive
encouragement and support for the improvement of health through grants to
support specific proposals from governmental agencies as well as from local and
International NGOs will aid in increasing worker productivity.

Employee and Community Opportunity

It is valuable to have reliable, non-corrupt contacts throughout civil
society as they have the pulse of the community in their ears. Where this is not
possible, it is best to have contacts who are, relative to their colleagues, the least
malevolent about the degree of their corruption – i.e. an official who hires his son
vs the official willing to fund the kidnap of his political critics.
Where the information received regarding needs in the community is
corroborated and does not perpetuate social mobility limitations, a new niche
market can be said to have been found. Addressing this new market is an
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opportunity for the MNC-led private sector coalition to support micro-enterprise.
Development of a small business to provide the service or product which will
meet the illuminated community need can be done in cooperation with the
business skill from the existent private sector, the market communication
potential of the civil sector and a locally identified entrepreneurial individual(s)
with the drive to make it happen. This coordinated team of sectors and skill sets
is best suited to the addressing of identified community needs through support of
micro- and small-businesses designed to meet those needs.
The corollary – do not engage with corrupt and/or illegitimate
governments, engage directly with the people instead in these cases – can be a
challenging corollary to MNCs. While their representatives realize they are met
with ruthlessly oppressive and corrupt governments, they realize too, at the same
time, that they really ought to pay someone for the resources they are extracting or
for the rights to the factory they are building.
Thinking of this payment in slightly altered terms, can help. Eventually,
the people of that state will need to receive in some form, recompense for the
natural resources being extracted (think of the waste from a factory as extracting a
percentage of the natural resource of a clean environment.) That is, the people
will, eventually, need to “be paid.” A firm or coalition of private firms can either
ensure up front, when they have, at least in a relative sense, greater leverage, that
the money will make its way back to the people or they can rest assured they will
need to pay far more than that initial cost in direct support of the people. How
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can this be done up front though? If the services delivery track record for the
current government is low, working through a resource fund is an excellent
option.
This entails the establishment of a fund into which a sizeable portion – as
much as all – of the monies paid in recompense for the natural resource to be
extracted will go. The amount and/or percentage will be determined by the
corruption level of the standing government and its delivery of services to the
populace. Where service delivery is extremely low, fund percentage will be on
the highest end of the spectrum.
This fund will need to then have broad accountability. This piece requires
that a stable, transparent bank be located – out of country if necessary – and then
that the established account have, to ensure representation of all demographics
and broad representation, a twenty-five person board chosen from across society,
the requirement of ten signatories to any withdrawal and disbursement, and fourfifths agreement on all projects toward which monies are disbursed. These
twenty-five and ten person groups will be codified as coming from across the
spectrum of societal sectors. Civil society leaders will be represented as will the
private sector through a coalitional representative and a chamber of commerce
representative. Both genders and all demographic and age groups will need to be
included as well as public sector employees.
The Petroleum Fund of Norway, now under the name Government
Pension Fund – Global, (Heilbrunn 2008; Norges Bank 2008) a voluntary fund
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run by the Norwegian government and putting away a portion of petroleum
revenues for needs of future generations can also be used as an additional, loose
guideline. This example though, should be thought of as only a loose guideline
because it is a voluntary one on the part of the government and the fund to which
we refer is a voluntary one on the part of the corporation, and in fact, in part, to
protect against, a government whose accountability is uncertain. As a result, there
will be necessary, small differences in the fund programs. Nor will all parts of
this program in one of the richest countries in the world will be applicable when
working in developing nations. With social creativity, community-wide, crosssectoral dialogue, and an eye to accountability and transparency, additional
setting-specific solutions can be found.

Training
In the construction phase of a mining project, we need to hire 500 local
unskilled laborers to be trained to work as helpers for skilled carpenters,
plumbers and electricians for a year and a half. In the operational, postconstruction phase though, we need only a fraction of that number. I have
been at the gate when the angry mob of those now trained and experienced
workers are told their services are no longer needed and they are out of a
job. But we have a year and a half lead time. Why can't we increase
security as a firm by contributing to the partnership between those we
employ during the construction phase and the local university, perhaps
participating in a program between these newly-skilled workers in concert
with a local business school or department? This partnership could strive
to create new markets and business cooperatives for these new skill sets?
If we begin this at the onset of construction, we will have a year and a half
or so for that market development to grow.
(Tim Pasquarelli, International Peril Mitigation Services 2008)
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In concert with any regionally-available higher education, private sector
coalition should find ways to make the following types of training available
toward the goal of creating capacity to take advantage of available opportunity
and for creating opportunity.
Producer group organizer – such that sellers will not be at the mercy of
middle men and “price-giver” brokers (Corporate Council on
Africa)
Vocational,
Leadership,
Management, and
Small-Business skill set: Thinking here is in terms of competitive
advantage. What is it that the firm has that can be of most benefit to increasing
local capacity? Besides capital, expertise tops that list. Leadership, management,
and small business expertise should be something relatively easy for the MNC to
instruct others in and/or to cooperate in instructing others in along with a local
school or university staff.

Wealth Spreading
Labor
A. Increase incentives for labor-intensive production while designing
labor market regulations that collaborate on employees’ and
employers’needs within the public sector’s capacity to implement the
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regulations. (IBRD 2005)
B. Labor percentages requirements, as discussed further Employment
Regime under Economy-Related.
C. Expectations upon labor should be humane and reasonable.
D. Adaptation through equipment and technology additions will increase
per worker productivity.
Microcredit
Allows for increase in capacity to access development benefits and to
participate in economic growth.
Vocational programs of one to two years.
In addition to other forms of education, vocational is valuable for its rapid
turnaround of skills.
Infrastructure
Participate in dialogues, committees, and projects designed to
encourage greater public spending on infrastructure while encouraging
delivery of core inputs to occur together: roads, electricity. (IBRD 2005)
Resources
Make resources, as well as trainings, available to aid medium, small,
micro, and artisan level businesses.
Value added Production Facilities
Raw materials processing creates jobs and spreads wealth.
Participate in increasing access to secondary education for girls. (IBRD 2005)
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Pro-Poor Growth (Closely related to Wealth Spread)
Pro-poor growth, a type of economic development with one of its foci on
ensuring to the greatest extent possible, that development does not make the least
well off worse off, is an important concept to keep in mind. While wealth spread
is the idea that a given business enterprise would be well served to work to spread
the effects of their enterprise from the wealthiest quintile of the population to
more of the population, pro-poor growth looks at the situation from the other
direction. This sort of growth looks to complement wealth spread by ensuring
that the lowest quintile is not made worse off.
A case can be made for inclusion of this idea and its resulting initiatives
under the “Economy-Related” subheading. In that it does relate indirectly to both
a downward moving economy and to a low income economy, that is appropriate.
It is the case however, that, if not directly addressed, the very poor can be made
less well off even in the presence of an upward moving economy or in one that is
moving toward middle-income, is middle-income, or higher. It is for this reason
that we have chosen instead to place it in the category labeled “Economic and
Community Opportunity” because of the opportunity for the MNC that is
generated through efforts that create benefit also to the local community as well
as to themselves.
In this way, with direct and specific focus upon ensuring that what appear
to be significant advances for an economy are not negatively impacting the
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demographic already hardest hit. Should this demographic be made less well off
by greater gains to the whole through inflation, or categorical or relative
deprivations, their then legitimate grievances and resulting – potentially violent attempts at rectifying the situation toward social justice would be costly to the
firms in the area and would also put into jeopardy, the initial and on-going
facilities investment.
To a large extent, Conflict-Sensitive Business and sustainable business
must be “pro-poor.” (IBRD 2005) Again, this is stated in that way not for the
benefit this brings to a demographic but because pro-poor development is
sustainable and therefore, financially more rewarding to the firm. This means in
part, that the economic development pursued must encourage wealth spread and
not wealth pooling. Though for over a quarter century, development scholars
thought of all development as good, we now know that some development creates
pockets of wealth and increases relative deprivation and often, absolute
deprivations as well. (Ross 2001)
Pro-poor growth enhances the ability of poor people to participate in
economic growth. (IBRD 2005) Some of the IBRD-indicated elements of propoor growth can apply to a private sector led initiative package. These are
indicated in the specific prescriptions list at the top of this Wealth Spreading
section.
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Supply Chain
Engaging the supply chain, improving the service quality provided while
also considering new partnerships to materially improve the well-being of
workers and communities is now a well-respected part of protecting one’s brand
and/or investment. This was again reiterated and enlarged upon in July of 2007 at
the UN Global Compact Leaders Summit in Geneva where Business for Social
Responsibility, a private-sector consortium, presented Beyond Monitoring: A
New Vision for Supply Chain Management. Beyond Monitoring is a four-part
approach designed to address the root causes of sustainability challenges found in
global supply chains.
Supply Chain could equally well go under the subcategory heading of
Absenteeism which incorporates health. The reason for this is that supply chain is
studied in part because of the high number of safety breaches firms are
responsible for but which occur under the charge of a sub-contractor in their
supply chain ala Newmont’s mercury spill in Indonesia. We have chosen to place
it within Employee and Community Opportunity because of the substantial
opportunity to increase employment and capacity through careful supply chain
management. Initiatives around this category should be thought of as potentially
addressing more than one of the conflict creation factors that make up Level II:
Common Elements.
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Human Security and Co-option
Human security is the branch of conflict prevention that thinks about the
responsibilities of states vis-a-vis the individual. This field follows from the idea
that states exist to serve their citizens (Schnabel 2004) and that this social contract
in particular – to the citizens – is the purpose for their existence from which their
legitimacy stems. The human security debate has successfully called for the
subjects of security to be redefined from the state to the individual (Richmond
2005). Closely related to this idea is the Responsibility to Protect movement
within international law that is moving in the same direction with the idea that
legitimacy of a government can be then revoked in the absence of services to
citizens. This means that, far from considering the responsibilities of a firm, this
movement in at least two sectors of international thinking, toward the individual
as the center of security, services, and sovereignty, allows firms the opportunity
to address the systemic violence present in a setting directly – and in so doing
decrease their own security costs while increasing their access to information that
can produce new markets, services, and products. Primary among these areas of
systemic violence (inequity) to be addressed for the firm’s benefit are access and
security to the individual in the areas of economic opportunity, food, and
governance.
From this piece of the Employee and Community Opportunity element, we
add then the following prescriptions:
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Sector coalition should work then not just on the supplying of services
delivery but also on increasing state’s capacity to deliver same.
As an early warning indicator, keep an eye to services provision –
observed slippage indicates a need for greater action to prevent
violence, and further escalation. (Schnabel 2004)
Survival, security, order, opportunity for material well-being and freedom
from want and freedom from fear are universal needs – as such they
need to be mainstreamed into corporate culture and thinking for
long-term investment and profit-stream protection. (Economic,
food, and political security.)
The costs of these non-traditional security threats can be as devastating as
those of more “traditional” security threats. Any degradation of quality of life is a
security threat (Schnabel 2004) whose costs must be represented in corporate
decision making. The relative decrease in quality of life that firms bring to those
they do not employ by increasing the costs of products and services in the area
then, must be addressed for the safety of the firm and its investments.
That question is asked by Tim Pasquarelli, Managing Partner of
International Peril Mitigation Services, a firm specializing in Community
Relations Programs for the security increases to the industries they serve, in this
way,
Often, those we do not employ, are made a little worse off than before we
arrived because of the inflation our wages and materials acquisition
causes. This too is a security issue because unhappy and angry people
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often turn to violence in their frustration. What can we, as a firm, do
with our lead time here, for this sector, to spread economic development
beyond ourselves such that we increase our own security through the
sustainable spread of indirect prosperity?
(Pasquerelli 2008)

Brenk and van de Veen (2005) refer to human security efforts as also
“addressing the material preconditions to violence.” Cattle rustling in rural Kenya
is one example they give, of conflict resulting from food security absences.
Lange and Quinn (2003) make the suggestion to organizations working within a
developing economy to work to strengthen the capacity of that population to resist
the effects of violent conflict. To address these direct and indirect effects, Lange
and Quinn suggest that,
By providing food, water, medical treatment, shelter and
sanitation, it [prevention effort] can reduce the suffering of noncombatants and, in doing so, strengthen the affected population’s
capacity to overcome the effects of further violent attacks and to
engage in efforts to build peace.
It is important here that we remember that the important question
regarding the above is not, what is the firm’s responsibility, but to think
differently by asking instead, what is the firm’s opportunity. In what ways will
business opportunities be expanded for us as they were for Caterpillar in
Piracicaba, because of increased stabilization; improved infrastructure; better
health services to workers, families, and potential small entrepreneurial suppliers;
strengthened capacity to resist effects of violence? In what ways will we discover
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new niches and demand for services by understanding efforts to stabilize,
reconcile, preconcile, or strengthen a region?
Private sector organizations are organizations working within a developing
economy and, they are, compositely, as largest investor, the organizational set
with the most at risk financially – even moreso than the local government and
populace because total investment of MNCs often exceeds combined investment
of other groups. For this reason, it is cost-sensible for the private sector to engage
in pre-conflict preparation for contributing to the capacity to resist.
In addition to ensuring or enhancing a population’s capacity to withstand
the effects of violence, it is sensible to work proactively as well, to strengthen that
population’s capacity to resist another related and indirect effect of violence – that
of co-option. Co-option occurs most significantly in settings of deprivation –
absolute, relative, and categorical or collective deprivations. (Bredel 2003)
For this reason, it is tied to the issue of human security – in the absence of
human security minimums, co-optability is highest and terrorist groups,
nationalist groups, workers rights groups all have their highest enrollment levels.
The prevention to this enrollment increase and the co-optability of desperate
people by those with other agendas, is by contributing to the assurances of human
security minimums. The dividend then to working to minimize these deprivations
to the extent possible for the collective of private sector actors involved – by
ensuring access to reasonably priced foods, contributing to more equitable
distributional systems, offering input toward greater access to opportunity – will
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be seen then twice. The first way is through avoiding destabilization and the
second is by preventing destabilization from resulting in chaos, violence, and
increased vulnerability of the populace to co-option by those with other agendas.
By addressing those needs of humans in the setting which are universal
needs, the coalition and its public sector partners will have prevented people from
adding themselves as fuel to someone else’s fire, thus removing the catalyzing,
fueling source necessary for the second stage of destabilization. It is in that
second stage when those who would profit from the initial destabilization and take
it further toward their own personal agendas, would gain momentum if they are
able to co-opt homeless, jobless, hungry, hopeless, people at that time.
Preventing this momentum-gain is a result of pro-active human security work as a
broad strategy within global citizenship. This strategy and underlying tactics
designed to meet the goal, decrease security costs as well as the larger losses that
result from civil war.
Having minimums of human security met, the populace will be
strengthened against co-option into identity and ideology driven agendas thereby
removing the momentum from the brewing, destabilizing, social movement. A
social movement with no underlying masse of staggeringly deprived citizens
lacking a pathway for grievance airing, is no movement at all.

Focus for non-violent social change must move from inter-state relations
to creation of intra-state pathways for change and growth. (Annan 2002; Miall
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1999.) This paper and these prescriptions described as a framework at three
levels – The Investment Sustainability Toolkit – helps the private sector to become
a successful, efficient and self-investing actor in this process through their
participation in multi-dimensional, comprehensive programs of socio-politicoeconomic institution building for the settings in which they do business. These
institutions of social, political, and economic capacity building are those that
would be considered both “internal” to the nation-state of business, as well as
“external.”

Beyond the Four
Helping with “the Reform Impasse” (law, courts, constitutional reform)
There are governmental activities that may delay or otherwise limit the
self-development capacity of a host nation. Corporations have a vested interest in
participating, as a sector, in the assurance as best they can, that these directions
are not selected. That expertise and experience is utilized to assist, in selection of
projects that most strengthen the capacity of the people and the nation to increase
their self-capacity.
Poor governance and less than effective policy is also, in a best case
scenario, reformed from within when possible. But to do so means challenging
deep corruption often with little more than one’s own integrity. It means facing
lengthy jail terms or execution.
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What the private sector actors can do to aid in their own battle for a longterm environment of stabilization in which to do business is to contribute to
making it safer for the courageous internal reform champions to win their
struggle.
Paul Collier (2007) suggests that through more intelligent development aid
and through increasing international law against both corruption and poor
governance, outsiders can offer successful assistance. Corporations and the
private sector as a whole offer something akin to “development aid,” while also
carrying a degree of leverage useful toward increase of law, codes, and standards
at the local, national, regional, and international levels.
Using this leverage when they have it, not just on policy changes and tax
situations which have immediate effect and on the firm narrowly, but also on
other policies which can aid in larger infrastructure commitments, and help the
firm more broadly and through indirect, but still significant, impacts, is a valuable
use of leverage.
A sector-wide small organization established to aid, through funds and
expertise, accountability, transparency, and candidates, is a second way that the
private sector can begin to participate in local efforts that will also aid themselves,
and to do so in a way that limits their exposure to risk.
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Research at home – and Further Engagement
Factors combination research: to supplement existing early warning data
research. Separating early indicators into Category A and Category B allows us
to see that even within the early indicators, there are those that signal us prior to
other contributing factors and which behave more as catalytic factors whereas
others are necessary but not sufficient. A (chronic deprivation, increasing
scarcity of basic necessities); B (human rights abuses, increasingly brutal political
oppression, inflammatory use of media, arms build up, organized killings.)
(Carnegie 1997)
“It is the linkages between CSR, conflict prevention, and Peacebuilding
that need to be further explored and linked to policy proposals.” (Rienstra 2004)
Further prescriptions beyond policy will be the additional result from such
research, contributing to greater profit, protected profit-streams, and safer
investment faster.
“The linkages between MNC activity and conflict have not been
thoroughly studied.” (Campbell 2004) Here too, research offers potential for
increased knowledge base, application of which will lead to greater ROI for
private sector actors.
Additionally, firms come to their own aid and that of others by working on
improvement of both early warning of developing crises and on responses to those
indicators. Because while there may be disagreement on scope and specifics of
preventive programs, “…there is no disagreement, however, on the importance of
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obtaining early warning…” (George and Holl 2000) Additionally, it is clear that
“marshaling timely, effective responses to warning has received much less
systematic attention.” (George and Holl 2000)
Early warning programs will generally fall into one of three category types
– Database (statistical indicators from time series data,) Expert Opinion (based on
country specific surveys and interviews,) and News Service Analysis (measures
occurrences of topical references.) The Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute’s approach is to combine types one and two. Unfortunately, their 10topic warning program is still too narrowly focused and too scattered, leaving
information from several readily available indicators out of the equation. (SIPRI)
The primary early warning indicator of imminent intrastate violence is
infant mortality, according to the U.S. State Failure Task Force. (Esty et al 1995)
This 1995 finding was retested in 2001 by Alex Schmid, UN Terrorism
Prevention Officer-in-Charge, with the same conclusion. Infant mortality acts as
an indicator of intrastate violence with a predictive capacity of 79.7%. Keeping
an eye to the action of infant mortality rates as well as including at the tactical
level, initiatives to decrease these rates and then maintain them at low levels, will
be effective investment toward both regional stabilization and profit-stream
sustainability.
A second valuable indicator to keep an eye on is taxation capacity (Pierson
1996) at 83.9% correlation. (Pierson 1996; Schmid 2001)
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The level of sectoral integration is also a valuable piece of data. This is
because the integration between religion groups, politics, and the private sector –
how well and how deeply they work together – gives information about both
corruption and about social mobility. As was discussed in more depth in the
Economics category, in a setting in which individual or group social mobility is
seen to be limited, conflict and escalation are the norm. (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and
Forgas 1981)
Engaging western governments in an effort to raise the priority of conflict
prevention in foreign policy comparable to the level exhibited by the G8 which
has, rhetorically at least, made conflict prevention focused on systemic failings, a
major theme of its meetings (Rubin 2002)
Additional engagement of western governments where possible toward
concerted action to support the more narrowed target of the bottom-billion
(Collier 2007) instead of the current focus on the world’s five billion poor, could
also be a potential source of value to firms. The more narrowed focus giving rise
to greater possibility of success, economic growth, and market development.

Additional Conclusions
Business has powerful, valuable roles to play in development and, through
development, in the prevention of destabilizing conflict. Through the increase of
stabilization, these roles will also have a recursive effect in increasing firms’ own
success and long-term profit stream protection.
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The Investment Sustainability Toolkit goes the farthest among assessment
and prevention tools to protect both the state and the firm and to do so through
articulation of these roles in development and violence prevention. The Toolkit
does s by keeping in mind two guiding principles.
1. Projects proposed, as well as component pieces of, must truly
maximize the combined mutual benefit of all stakeholders. This does
not need to be measured out quantitatively but can be empirically
understood, indirectly, through the various dimension of number 2 –
local and regional socio-politico-economic stabilization.
2. Local and regional stabilization is, in an array of dimensions – sociopolitico-economic and environmental among others – critical to any
sustainable profit stream and must be encouraged pro-actively in
transparent and socially sustainable ways.

Governments too, of developing nations, can utilize the Toolkit in the
same way a firm would utilize it, toward the related goal of attracting investment
to aid the economic development of their nation. This utilization aids in insuring
that any attracted investmetn is of the wealth-spreading, socially sustainable type
and will therefore play a role in the state’s development that will be positive in the
long-term as well as in the short.
The Investment Sustainability Toolkit is valuable to corporations then, in
two ways. The first is in project assessment phase by allowing hidden costs to be
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revealed, costs which would otherwise decrease projects’ sustainability and cause
less-than-maximally successful projects to be approved and implemented. This
assessment portion of a project also will allow for prevention behaviors or
initiatives to be identified without which, projects that would be profitable remain
too risky and are not selected. This alleviates costs to firm in the category of
opportunity cost. Projects otherwise abandoned for risk can proceed through
identification of mitigating strategies, increasing benefit to both the MNC and to
the developing nation indicated by the project proposal.
The second is in allowing for on-going dynamic assessment to changing
conditions in the social groups – including their relationship to each other, to
government, and to the firm – in the political structure, to local and global
economic factors, the environment and importantly, to other factors along these
and other dimensional lines not yet indicated or understood as factoring into the
sustainability and mutual-profitability equation.
Framework thus will be valuable in:
1. Allowing projects to be selected that are truly maximally
successful,
2.

Allowing projects that might otherwise not go forward to do
so based on successfully identified, low-cost initiatives to
mitigate and prevent conflict risk from manifesting,

3. Allowing for on-going mitigation of dynamic alterations to all
of the dimensions of the project’s sustainability – including
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socio-politico-economic, environmental and importantly, as of
yet unidentified dimensions affecting outcome.
Let us now examine the lenses through case study analysis of current and
pre-civil war (1979) Liberia.
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SECTION IV

BRIEF CASE STUDY REVIEW

The Toolkit in Liberia
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As we apply the Toolkit in The Republic of Liberia, we will focus on three
key intervention opportunities identified through The Toolkit’s lenses.
Background and historical data will be included only as relevant. A snapshot of
key country data is included at the end of this section and an historical timeline is
additionally included as Appendix II.
A closer look was given specifically to Firestone Liberia. This is because
it was our goal to show what one firm could do, alone or as the leader of a private
sector coalition. The reason we have selected Firestone Liberia from among the
many firms available is because Firestone Liberia has the longest, most
intertwined, private-sector history in Liberia.
Firestone would be in a position to lead such a coalition but it is important
to note that Firestone is only intended here as a representative of the private
sector. It is not suggested that this firm is the cause of any violence nor that they
could have, alone, prevented any. The Toolkit is a coalitional tool. Therefore,
Firestone is not intended, in any way, to be the lone focus of this look at what
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initiatives would have been identified through the use of the toolkit by a coalition
of private sector actors.

THE THREE KEY INTERVENTION OPPORTUNITIES
Of the many major and minor opportunities for conflict prevention
initiatives, we will focus on three specifically. Minor issues will then be
combined within one of the three larger headings where appropriate. There are
other valuable issue areas deserving of analysis that are outside the scope of this
discussion. Our effort here is to illustrate identification and mitigation
specifically arising through the Toolkit’s three levels starting with Level One – the
linking of firm self-interest to the self-interest of other stakeholders and viewing
maximized mutual self-interest as best interest.
To this end, the three key interventions which will be discussed following
historical presentation of country are:
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¾ Staple Food Price Stabilization – and non-vulnerability
¾ Negotiation Losses that Look Like Wins
¾ Labor Conditions – And Other Losses that Look Like Wins
They are presented, along with accompanying secondary initiative prescriptions
identified by the Toolkit, in chronological order. This order represents an
important aspect to the interventions: Timing – itself discussed as a type of fourth
intervention recommendation – the Timing of Stabilization Perpetuation.
First Opportunity: STAPLE FOOD PRICE STABILIZATION

The background of Liberia does not include nineteenth century
colonization. Yet, it still suffered from the effects of an exclusionary ruling class
– that of resettled, freed American slaves who then denied citizenship to the
indigenous Africans until 1904. (U.S. State Dept 2008) Twenty ethnic groups
make up 95% of Liberia’s population while the descendants of freed slaves from
the U.S. and the Caribbean make up the other 5%. (LNIC 2008)
In 1926, the Liberian government signed a concession agreement with
Firestone, Inc. allowing them to develop the nascent rubber industry, leasing the
land – a million acres – at $.06 an acre. This agreement was the beginning of the
first private rubber plantation in the world, one which today is also the largest.
The agreement also allowed for the assurances needed by Firestone in order to go
forward with long-term investment commitment.
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According to the organization, Liberia Past and Present (2008) Firestone’s
million acres is equal to 4% of the country {1,000,000acres/(96,320 sq km * 247
acres/sq km)} and at least 10% of the arable land – depending on the percentage
of Firestone’s lease that is arable land. The CIA World Factbook (2008) lists only
3.43% of Liberia’s 23.8 million acres as arable or fewer than a million (800,000).
Even in 2003, only 7413 acres were irrigated in the country.
The True Whig Party (TWP,) the political party representing this minority
demographic, dominated until 1980, governing as a single-party state. In April of
that year, Samual K. Doe, a military leader of Krahn ethnic origin, staged a coup
overthrowing then-president William Tolbert following rioting in response to the
spiraling price of rice. (BBC 2008) This riot, dubbed, the “Rice Massacre” of
1979 was the onset of violence that was to last 24 years only ending in 2003 with
the succession of a transitional government. This transitional government was
succeeded again, in late 2005, by the elected government of Madam Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf.
As the staple food in Liberian households, rice and the price of rice, have
been recurring themes in conflict in the region. In the 1400s when Portuguese
traders came to Liberia, the area was so agriculturally rich, it was known as “The
Grain Coast.” Liberia supplied agricultural exports to European markets
throughout this time and food self-sufficiency and exportation remained the norm
until the 19th century. (Liebenow 1987) At this time, the return of freed slaves
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and the subsequent change in leadership and policy re-directed Liberia toward
food imports and exportation of only natural resources. (Gonpu 2007)
In the period 1976-1984, though food production became more efficient,
food import needs rose. (World Resources Institute) Imports of rice went from
1300 metric tons in 1978 to 26,000 in 1981. This carried with it an increase in the
price of rice – Liberia’s staple food – to the end user. It was this rice price
increase which created both the politico-social destabilization spiral that Liberia
then entered beginning with the forty-plus 1979 riot deaths and the opening for
furthering that spiral of destabilization.
The riots of April 14, 1979 will forever be etched in the history of
Liberia as a time when businesses were looted, scores wounded and
a few killed over the increase in the price of rice. Daily Observer Editorin-Chief, Rodney D. Sieh explains why the West African nation's staple
food has been the source of many of its troubles. Until that fateful day in
1979, Liberia was enjoying the kind of stability only few could boast
of in Africa. But an increase in the price of rice changed it all…
(Sieh 2005)
In fact, Liberia was, in 1978, listed in the Guiness Book of World Records
as the most stable country in Sub-Saharan Africa. This stability however,
represents the greatest of the Conflict Risk factors overlooked by the then current
private sector in Liberia – a sector that would work hard not to overlook a
Political Risk factor – and the greatest opportunity for a low-cost conflict
prevention initiative with a high Return on Investment. This is because it is in
times of stability that institutions to perpetuate stability can best be created.
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Here, the offering to Liberia of a

Toolkit Created Recommendation
Common Fund for Rice Price
Stabilization
¾ Establish Common Fund from
private sector coalition.
¾ Supplement staple food payments
from citizens when price rises –
leaving price to enduser unchanged.
¾ Return money to fund when cyclical
price falls – again leaving price to
enduser unchanged but replenishing
resources of the Common Fund and
leaving it, over a period of years, at
roughly equal its initial level.
¾ Through investment of Fund
resources, it is possible that only the
interest, and not the prinicipal, be
used for the flattening of the price
cycle.
¾ Slight Cost of Living increases in the
food price can be allowed but should
be monitored in relation to the level
of unemployment and general
capacity to pay.
¾ Additional price fluctuations can be
due to third party middlemen.
Coalition and government should
work together to minimize
vulnerability from this source
through maximizing alternatives.

simple borrowing and repayment plan
(sidebar) one that would stabilize the
price of rice to the enduser, would have
prevented this particular riot. Further, it
would have prevented this factor from
then catalyzing the already high levels
of unemployment and the relative and
categorical deprivation tensions already
present in the setting. In preventing the
riots of 1979, which were the opening
for the coup d’etat of 1980, this one
effort would have contributed much
toward the possible prevention of the
twenty five years of violent powerseeking that followed. For it was the

power vacuum created in that moment of violence that opened the door to violent
power-seeking. Any contribution to the prevention of opportunities for powerseeking could have aided in allowing for non-violent resolution to the other social
tensions in the air resulting from deprivations. What existed in Liberia in 1979
was the intersection of people’s legitimate grievances with agendas of personal
profit from power hungry individuals. The addressing of people’s grievances
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removes that fodder from availability to other agendas while addressing the
catalyzing issue which allowed for the intersection of the two groups. Through an
institutionalized mechanism, something like a Common Fund, triggering events
and causal fodder are removed from the setting.
The Commission on International Development Issues chaired by Willy
Brandt, puts it this way, “…prices should be stabilized…to become less
vulnerable to market fluctuations. For this reason, the proposed Common Fund,
and ... existing schemes for compensating against instability should be improved
and expanded.” (1980)
Were this borrowing and repayment system with the then-democratic
government of Liberia to have been instituted simultaneously with campaigns of
rice independence – structural changes allowing for greater vendor choice –
increased domestic production, agricultural-efficiency training, and of
reconciliation and rehumanization between the social groups, additional Conflict
Risk factors would have been addressed and, to differing degrees, mitigated.
While there was stabilization to the greatest degree seen in Sub-Saharan Africa,
indirect influence upon ruling elite (see p. 157) guiding them to see their selfinterest in addressing the growing popular dissatisfaction with the status quo,
would have begun to address an additional key factor in the setting.
Institutionalization of mechanisms for addressing these as well as of the processes
for creating and distributing the selected mechanisms for redirection, is also
valuable. (Toolkit – Economy Related: 2)
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Despite that fact that, according to many, the extreme fluctuation of the
price of rice – an imported good – was the triggering cause of this violence and
that that price is closely tied to the import of rice, domestic rice production
potential toward rice independence has never been significantly explored.
Operation Production – Tolbert’s 1963 effort to raise interest in local rice
production – did not occur in a way that fully explored the realistic possibilities.
As a result, the country remains today an importer of 100% of its staple food,
dependent on and vulnerable to, the pricing vagaries of the small group of rice
importers holding contracts.
The import of rice is largely controlled in Liberia by a small group of
traders whose own ethnic heritage is Lebanese. Now president, Mrs. Johnson
Sirleaf was, in 2003, the Chairman of the Special Rice Committee set up by
Transitional Chairman Charles Gyude Bryant. This was established to investigate
circumstances surrounding the constant increase in the price of the commodity.
Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf concluded in her report that one of the major causes of
that continued increase is the failure of past governments to halt the monopoly on
its importation. Mrs. Sirleaf told a news conference that year that government
officials are greatly involved in soliciting and taking bribes from importers. She
called on government to dismiss officials found in such malpractices especially
with the issue of rice. (Sieh 2005)
Imports in Liberia nearly doubled (to 72%) in 2006, led by petroleum and
rice along with a substantial increase in machinery and transport equipment due to
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the reconstruction effort. Rice has been described by Minister of Commerce,
King-Akerele, as a “strategic and security issue.” The situation must be addressed
immediately. “We are,” she says, “obliged to pay particular attention, monitor,
and manage this situation of rice in Liberia.” (Flomo 2007)
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Rice Report was the disclosure
that two major importers of the commodity, the Lebanese-owned businesses
Bridgeway and K & K Corporation are indebted to government in the amount of
USD 3.5 million in taxes which Mrs. Sirleaf said has been waived to these firms.
This indicates an important role for the current government in the monopoly on
rice traders and reduction in rice-dependency that will result from vendor choice.
Lebanese traders have been in the country for several generations.
Inflation is their trademark. Their earnings are not re-invested in Liberia but sent
home as remittances. They are known for their capacity to embed themselves
with people of influence and then to use that influence to their advantage. (Sieh
2005; Liebenow 1987)
This opportunity to reduce import dependency while also increasing the
available numbers of importers represents a more current opportunity for a private
sector coalition to benefit themselves and protect their investments from future
violence by acting today to address the factors leading to violence. Today’s
actions include efforts to create and expand the political and civil institutions that
perpetuate stability. Identification of additional opportunities to link firm selfinterest to the self-interest of other stakeholders – such as through economic
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stabilization especially as regards access to primary commodities such as staple
foods of the region, and through avoidance of losses that look like wins – is a
second set of actions that firms can, through coalitional action, engage in today to
prevent the high private sector costs arising from conflict and violence. Both sets
are readily identified through application of the Investment Toolkit and an
internalized mindset of conflict prevention as in the firm’s best interest.
Specifically here to be manifested
through contribution to internal cultivation of staple crops toward staple crop
independence. Support for governmental
re-evaluation and increase of licensed
staple crop importers, is also indicated.
The strategy of cultivating agri-culturalexports-based estates should be included
along with rice cultivation and increased
importers. This was tried in the 1960s
and 1970s and aimed to increase crop
diversification. Too heavy focus on the
rubber industry precluded success with
this strategy at that time. Spreading the
focus now, to other industries – such as
edible oils – while rubber and iron ore
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The Key Areas for Stabilization
The interim Poverty
Reduction Strategy of Liberia
will guide its government for
two years with these four
pillars.
1. Enhancing National
Security,
2. Revitalizing economic
growth,
3. Strengthening
governance and the rule
of law, and
4. Rehabilitating
infrastructure and basic
service delivery.
The first goal is contributed to
by executing the other three. If
we therefore replace the word
national with firm, we see that
numbers 2,3, and 4 represent a
guide equally successful for
adoption by a private sector
coalition. (Staple Food is
covered under basic service
delivery.)
In this way the key areas for
stabilization – political,
socioeconomic, infrastructure,
and services – are addressed.

are still vital will aid in increasing economic growth, spreading wealth throughout
the economy, and in improving quality of life. The participation of a private
sector coalition in contributing expertise, analysis, and indirect influence upon
this process will be valuable in long-term investment protection.

Other Interventions During Same Time Period
1. Timing for Stabilization Perpetuation
Additional initiatives identified by the Screening Checklist of the Toolkit’s
Level III are discussed within the timeframe within which they ought to – for
greatest success – have taken place. The reason that timing is important is
because it is during times of relative stability that opportunities to create the
institutions to perpetuate stability exist.
As we assess time periods for potential re-stabilizing initiatives by a
private sector coalition, we will be looking at both triggering events and at deeper
tensions. We will look at each with an eye toward what can be done if anything
to reduce or prevent each. No attempt at identifying these as causal will be
indicated. Each is mentioned only as a contributing factor, mitigation or
reduction of which reduces the escalation potential of the whole.
In 1979, the following key points for successful investment protection
through linking firm success with others’ success were identified by the lens of
the Investment Sustainability Toolkit.
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1979
¾ rice price stabilization and non-dependency program;
¾ addressing of popular exclusion;
¾ institution development for stability perpetuation.
More on Timing
Other periods, those immediately following the escalation to violence for
instance, are not highly viable for private sector intervention. Two examples of
less successful periods for intervention are those years subsequent to April, 1980
with the onset of Doe’s coup d’etat, and April 1999 when fighting broke out
under Charles Taylor in Voinjama.
A single representative of a private sector coalition may choose to act as a
mediative voice representing a stakeholder group(s), they can still offer space for
dialogue and, if recommendations for establishing dialogue processes during
stability have been followed, they can offer continuation of those processes.
Private sector is not excused from mitigation activities during violence – indeed
their own self-interest is even more tied up with successful mitigation than ever
before. However, once violence has broached a minimum level, compromising
physical security, the best opportunities for successful re-direction of social
tensions by the private sector has past.
Private sector intervention best precedes these periods as opposed to the
option of taking place during the periods of highest violence. It becomes a
thinking process not of how our coalition can best assist in resolving this situation
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of high tension and/or violence but instead, what our private sector compendium
can do to prevent it, to allow for the social change toward perpetuation of
stabilization to occur while also preventing existing conflicts from triggering
events that would lead that search for greater individual and group mobility at the
heart of the conflict to move instead toward violence.

1979
The setting of 1979 Liberia was one in which deprivations as a result of
long-term, minority, single party rule – The True Whig Party (TWP) representing
5% of the population (Liebenow 1987) – intersected with increases in the price of
rice, Liberia’s staple food. (BBC 2008; Liebenow 1987; Sieh 2005) When a
minority party rules, spreading the benefits of that rule throughout the population
is an approach that can lead to stabilization and sustainable rule. This was not the
approach chosen by generations of successive TWP rulers and as such, Doe’s
coup was seen as a moment of hope for and by the majority of Liberians. Albeit a
short moment. (Berkeley 1992) This is because it was hoped by the indigenous
majority that Doe, an ethnic Krahn, would bring socio-economic and
representational justice to the majority. Doe’s reign though, proved no more
successful for the people than had that of his predecessor, almost immediately
becoming more oppressive than that of the deposed (Dryer 2003) and leaving the
country in economic ruin. It is often stated that Charles Taylor and his
administration, following Doe’s, destroyed the economy and infrastructure of
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Liberia during and following the brutal civil war on which they rode to power.
Samuel Doe’s administration though, had already brought significant and
staggeringly negative changes in that sector prior to Taylor’s arrival, leaving a
nation decimated relative to the pre-Doe conditions. (BBC 2008)
In 1997 when Mr. Taylor was elected two years after the Abuja II peace
agreement was signed, it was actually seen as a positive change for the country.
But this sense came in spite of the reality that his NPFL had already begun
fighting West African peacekeepers and had also already fractured into factions.
(US State Dept) Anti-government fighting broke out again in the north in 1999
with Mr. Taylor accusing Guinea of supporting the rebellion internal to Liberia.
Ghana, and Nigeria meanwhile, accused Mr. Taylor of backing Sierra Leonian
rebels.
“Around 250,000 people were killed in Liberia's civil war and many
thousands more fled the fighting. The conflict left the country in economic ruin and overrun with weapons. The capital remains without
electricity mains or running water. Corruption is rife and unemployment and illiteracy are endemic.”
(BBC as of Jan 16, 2008)
Both moments of hope however, represent immense opportunity, opportunity
for significant success and profit for a private sector coalition. In addition to
staple food stabilization and non-vulnerability, the coalition could have, to their
own significant financial benefit, aided in prevention of escalation of the
following social tensions to violence as well. The combination of interventions is
identified by the second and third layers of the toolkit.
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¾ campaign of rice independence,
¾ agricultural-efficiency and diversity training, implementation,
¾ reconciliation and rehumanization – events and establishment of space,
process, and habit
¾ indirect influence upon ruling elite guiding them to see their self-interest
in addressing the growing popular dissatisfaction with the status quo,
¾ general efforts toward creation of institutions to perpetuate stability during
times of stability.
Prior to 1979
Questioning Standard Operating Procedure
Two sources of tension between the indigenous Liberians and the five
percent of the population who comprised the ruling TWP, grew stronger prior to
this timeframe and beginning in the late 1960s. Firestone inadvertently entered
into and exacerbated both long-standing sources of tension through what began as
a very good idea.
One of the important tenets of a neo-liberal economic reform agenda for
economic development is that of privatization. Private ownership of capital assets
to enable the market to work freely and at the correct price set by supply and
demand. The problem however, which exists with the privatization idea is not in
the concept or existence of private capital assets. It is in the process of arriving at
that scenario.
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Quietly but steadily, … those who had the ear of the president engaged in
one of the most extensive programs of private land acquisition outside of
South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese dependencies. The actual
extent of the transfer of title from tribal land to freehold land was not a
matter of public record…So outrageous was the covert acquisition of land
that President Tubman himself …noted that several citizens—including
the chiefs allied with the Americo-Liberian ruling class—had acquired
estates of up to twenty thousand acres.
(Liebenow 1987)

This inequity, described here by J.Gus Liebenow, dean of academic affairs
and founding director of Indiana University’s African Studies Department, is, like
all inequities, representative of a risk. This risk is in the category we refer to as
Conflict Risk. Like Political Risk factors, Conflict Risk factors as well, do not
mean that business should not be pursued. Conflict Risk factors mean, rather, that
low-cost initiatives to mitigate the factor by creating convergence in the inequity,
are required.
Additionally, at that time, the removal of legal distinctions between the
two social groups – tribal peoples and Americo-Liberians – required both groups
to participate in the justice system of the one group representing the powerholders. Unfamiliar with the workings of such a judicial system, the interests of
the tribal peasants went underrepesented. The gains of this group, while relatively
improved, were improved by a far smaller percentage than that experienced by the
Americo-Liberian elite (Liebenow 1987.)
It was in the 1970s, through Firestone’s good idea toward aiding the
establishment of private rubber farms in the region that unintended exacerbation
occurred. The idea, cultivating small businesses in the form of locally-owned
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rubber farms from whom they would make purchase, was a great one – right in
line with conflict prevention initiatives and an understanding of how this is equal
to protecting and improving one’s own bottom line. To be successful though,
these small farms would have needed to be small businesses – owned and
operated by families both within the general population and who would work the
land locally, instead of hiring expatriate plantation managers. Successful
microenterprise would have followed with its subsequent wealth-spread effects
and money-multiplier ripples, enabling demand to also grow.
Most of the farms went to politicians with the greatest access to power and
resources instead of to those without then-current resources, thereby significantly
diluting the wealth-spread effects. Those politicians then also hired foreigners for
the highest levels of the plantations, further decreasing wealth-spread and moneymultiplier effects. The foreign managers, then repatriating their wages while
preventing career growth for the locals who worked as tree-tappers,
unintentionally stymied economic growth twice.
Firestone representatives did nothing out of line, nothing more than follow
along with then status quo, standard operating procedure. To get the result they
were looking for – the return, in security and a larger local economy, on their
investment – however, they would have needed to be out in front of those
procedures instead, suggesting alternatives through a private sector coalition.
Creating opportunities for less-well-off Liberians to purchase the farms, through a
cooperative, would have been one example of a better solution. Such co146

operatives could have been further assisted – and Firestones’ return further
guaranteed – through a mentoring program if necessary, to ensure that the new
owners and their employees had the expertise necessary to manage the plantation
and the business and to market the rubber and grow the business.
Later, Firestone held off on engaging in the twenty year replanting process
needed by the plantation because of a delay in approval of a concession
agreement with then-President Charles Taylor which would promise no radical
change in tax status (Moore 2002.) This short-sighted analysis of the cost/benefit
of replanting not only endangered their investment to date, it further increased the
inadvertent contribution to conflict, stretching it out into the future because of the
number of years of growth required to maintain a rubber forest.
In this case, as in many around the world, the wealth gap between the
groups also widened every year, due to imbalances in training opportunities and
restrictions in upward mobility – areas which a Firestone-led private sector
coalition could have influenced, bringing economic benefit and goodwill to
Firestone.
Each of these aforementioned dynamics could have been prevented or, at
worst, mitigated, with a mainstreamed culture of prevention beginning with a
mindset of collaboration and the primary question foremost in mind – Will this
behavior aid in key areas of stabilization or be a loss that looks like a win? Will
this behavior link firm success to success of other stakeholders?
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Second Opportunity:
NEGOTIATION LOSSES THAT CAN LOOK LIKE WINS
“Indeed, the depth of hostility that lay beneath the surface
had been masked to the outside world.”
(Liebenow 1987)
Assessing the annual land lease fee through the Toolkit lens - one that
slightly redirects the standard negotiation concept of maximizing one’s own,
narrowly defined, gain – we see that what looks like a great negotiation coup has
concealed from us some very real costs. At $.06 per acre (=$60,000/yr) from
1926-2005 and now $.50 per acre since 2005 ($500,000/yr,) it is not enough to
meet either of the two goals payments in return for resources must meet if the
firm hopes for sustainability. (Toolkit – Economy-Related: 3a,b) Note – In 2008,
this was again renegotiated – this time to 2 USD/acre/year. What this means is
that also to be kept in mind during a negotiation is whether the total payment
represents a sufficiently adequate percentage of return from natural resources to
be abel to meet the following two goals. The “Grants” option (Box p 146) is a
second pathway, an alternative to lower upfront, negotiated costs, which will also
allow for the meeting of the following two goals.
The first goal such payments must meet is to allow the citizens of the host
country to legitimately feel they are receiving just compensation for the resources
of their nation. (See section on return payments and folk conceptions of justice,
page 65.) The results of that research remind us that private sector contributions
(positive) must be obvious to the citizens – and that citizens’ “return payments,”
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here the perceived negative impact upon them, must not be grossly out of
proportion to the services received.
The second goal of these payments is to ensure that a government making
legitimate efforts to be responsive to the people, will have the resources necessary
to do so. Within this goal is the idea that such a government might also have
resources to create conditions that will allow for wealth to spread. In this way,
economic development could potentially proceed in a far-reaching, sustainable
way. This sort of majority-centric, pro-poor economic development requires
infrastructure for political pluralism as well as for economic pluralism. This
means governmental incomes – and private sector remuneration packages – must
be sufficient to support infrastructure development and each piece of that income
must be priced accordingly.
These two goals help us understand why a contract can be viewed as
inequitable. Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues, put it this way, “Fair Contracts are More
Stable.” Under that heading, he continued, reflecting the voice of the eighteen
member commission representing five continents,
It is important to recall that when multinational corporations have
at the outset made inequitable contracts with developing countries –
particularly in minerals – the result has often been that the contracts
have run into trouble. We believe strongly that there is a close connection between the equity and stability of investments. …if the initial
terms are tilted in favor of the investors they will tend in the end to
make the investment less stable. Contracts should aim at fairness…
(Brandt 1980)
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Specifically as concerns the pricing of primary commodities for export, the
commission had this to say:
Earnings from commodities must be strengthened… They (developing nations) should be enabled to process their own raw materials
locally and to participate in their international marketing, transport
and distribution.
(Brandt 1980)
When looking at land as a natural resource and raw material, this means
that recompense (rents) for use of this natural resource must be commensurate as
a percentage, with the total income of the state necessary to produce success. It is
not income alone but income and most efficient, expeditious usage of income that
creates success. Both pieces must be monitored by firms wishing to secure the
greatest return on their investment and to secure the largest profit-stream in a
sustainable, long-term way.
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GRANTS
Arriving at Total Resource Recompense
One way to achieve “fair” land prices
But how do we arrive at that total package that is both “fair” and allows for potential
governmental success? Through the grants approach, efficiency and competency
standards can remain with the firm.
¾ Ascertain necessary project – infrastructure, food stability, services delivery, etc.
¾ Working with NGO and civil society, seek out small businesses locally to
address project. These may need to be created,
¾ Advertise availability of grant contract to meet ascertained project,
¾ Work with contract/grant recipients and partner with NGOs and civil society, to
ensure success and efficiency through mentoring and resource access.

During periods when a government accountable to the electorate is in
place – even for a few years – a slightly higher total remuneration package is a
greater win for the firm. Informal participation in ensuring that roads, schools,
hospitals, minor medical supplies and other infrastructure are improved through
grants and remuneration, is to the benefit of the private sector. (Toolkit –
Economy Related: 3a,b)

Other Interventions During Same Time Period

1. Timing for Stabilization Perpetuation
It is during times of relative stability that opportunities to create the
institutions to perpetuate stability exist.
As we assess time periods for potential re-stabilizing initiatives by a
private sector coalition, we will be looking at both triggering events and at deeper
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tensions. We will look at each with an eye toward what can be done if anything
to reduce or prevent each. No attempt at identifying these as causal will be
indicated. Each is mentioned only as a contributing factor, mitigation or
reduction of which reduces the escalation potential of the whole.

In 1981 and again in 1989, the following key points for successful
investment protection through linking firm success with others’ success were
identified by the lens of the Investment Sustainability Toolkit.

Key Points
1981-1984 and 1989-1992 –
¾ addressing socio-economic disparity,
¾ civil society strengthening,
¾ patronage-system alternative assessment and change,
¾ alternative governmental resources,
¾ Western aid lobbying,
¾ development of inter-organizational dialogue space and
process
¾ greater inclusion,
¾ reconciliation events.
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1981-1984

In 1985, Samuel Doe had fifty political opponents assassinated and had
shut down the independent presses in the country. He had begun to like the taste
of power. However, prior to that, and beginning in April of 1981, Doe’s rule
began with the establishment of a constitution on the anniversary of the coming to
power of his party, the Peoples’ Redemption Council (PRC.) At that time he
created a twenty five member constitutional council led by renowned Liberian,
Dr. Amos Sawyer saying that the new constitution should pave the road to a
genuine democracy. At this time, he was still moving forward with his plan to
return the army to the barracks, removing it from the country’s leadership. (van
der Kraaij 1994) However, the ban on political parties put in place initially to
establish stability had not yet been removed a year later. It did not get removed
until 1984 under pressure from international governments. At this time he
allowed three of the nine parties wishing to run against him to do so, but only
after the assassination of fifty opponents. The ballots were counted in secret by
his own staff who determined him to be the winner. He then put in place a
constitution – a process which had stalled – also under external pressure. At this
time, it appeared to the outside world that Liberia was setting democratic
institutions into place. However, the shutting down of independent presses and
other democratic institutions was only just beginning.
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Co-option of ethnicity was a major factor in the repression and violence of
the Doe regime. His Krahn-based Presidential Guard massacred 3000 Mano and
Gio civilians in 1985 in response to the Quiwonkpa coup attempt and again in
response to Taylor’s coup. It was against the same ethnic groups that violence
toward civilians was targeted more generally.
This was in part because the government under Doe had little other than
ethnicity upon which to base its power (Dunn 1999) thus causing their failed
attempt to remove themselves and the citizens they had hoped to represent, from
the cycle of the gate-keeper state (Cooper 2002.) (Identifying lens Toolkit –
Preconciliation: 3.) The ethnic based patronage system in Liberia, in being more
extensive and open than those in Uganda and Rwanda is pointed to as a key factor
in the divergent style of leadership. With ethnicity still at the forefront of
violence, the non-patronage based guerilla governments of Uganda and Rwanda
had specific incentives to engage in sincere efforts to address the conditions that
had led to violence. Alternatively, in Liberia, Taylor’s patronage based regime,
like Doe’s, gained no benefit from, and therefore had no motivation toward,
sincere effort to address the conflict-creating conditions. (McDonough 2008)
Therefore, these years, the first four of the Doe regime, represent the window of
opportunity available for the following efforts. And it is during this window that
efforts to address the ethnic basis and patronage style of the Doe regime through a
civil society-private sector partnership would have been of primary importance in
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the linkage of the success of the private sector to success of the locale and other
stakeholders.
The absence of established dialogue space and process among civil society
and between civil society, government and a private sector (Toolkit –
Preconciliation: 1) made both his repression and the patronage-based system
behind it easier to pursue.
Between 1980 and 1990, Liberia received hundreds of millions of dollars
from the U.S. in aid. (Nelan 1990) Yet this was the wrong time in Liberian history
for the benefit of aid to be felt by average Liberians. Reagan escalated aid from
$20 million in 1979 to 402 million for 1981-1985. During this same period,
Doe’s government was exterminating with brutality, members of the Gio and
Mano tribes, seen as foes to Doe’s Krahn tribe. Daily abductions, decapitations,
and disembowelments left mutilated bodies in the street. (Nelan 1990) Seven
coup attempts against Doe occurred between 1980 and 1985 as a result of his
violent tactics.
This reality represents a missed opportunity of the government of the U.S.
to choose a policy option more in keeping with the increase of national security
then, and in the future. Because monies given as economic aid are not held to
traditional investment standards and because they also do not have effective
guidelines for settings of incompetence or worse, even as private investment
slows and stops, aid investment continues. (Easterly 2001) “Higher aid worsens
bureaucratic quality and leads to violation of the law with more impunity,” is the
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result of a study by World Bank economist Stephen Knack. (Knack 2001 in
Easterly) A private sector coalition for Liberia could only have affected this
through use of their combined lobbying influence upon governmental policy in
the U.S. (Toolkit – Preconciliation: 4; Beyond the Four: 2)
1989-1992 (similar to 1981-1984)
There is much violence during this period which coincides with the first
half of the first civil war. However, as Charles Taylor’s coup progresses, there is
opportunity for less-than-representative government to be moved toward greater
democracy. Charles Taylor’s coup of Doe, like Doe’s of Tolbert, was again
heralded by the people as an opportunity to rid themselves of a repressive dictator.
It was Taylor’s intent as it was Doe’s before him, to bring greater representation
and new opportunity to the people. Today’s president, Ms. Johnson-Sirleaf, was
an early supporter of Taylor against Doe, only falling out with him and being
charged with treason when Taylor’s new and unspoken intentions became clear.
(BBC Profiles series 2008)
It is possible that a factor identified by African historian, Frederick Cooper
(2002,) is at work in this iterative ruling process in Liberia as it was elsewhere.
Cooper points out that limited economic success did not give leaders confidence
in the potential for generalized prosperity for which they could then claim credit
leading to furthered political success. As a result, each leader in turn learned
quickly that their own interests could not be served by the political process but by
the same process the colonists used, a channel Cooper has labeled gate-keeping –
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rents gained primarily from control over access between, the gate between, the
interior and outside worlds.
It was not until December of 1989 that things began to, “fall apart.”
(Adebajo 2002) Furley and May (2006) point to several factors that induced
repeat violence in Liberia. This time period offers an opportunity for them to
begin being addressed to prevent continued relapses toward violence. The factors
are most successfully addressed by a private sector coalition acting in concert
with civil society, local and international governments along with international
financial institutions. The items they indicate are each addressed through the
levels of the FSI Sustainability Toolkit. They are: exclusion of some groups from
the mediation and dialogue processes, civil society involvement, reconciliation
events, economic development, and failure to address the conditions which led to
war including socio-economic convergence. (Toolkit – Preconciliation: 1, 6, 5;
Economy Related: All; Employee and Community Opportunity: 2,3.)
Much of the time, the greatest leverage that can be exercised by a firm –
even where other forms may be available – is something not even often thought of
as leverage. Just as firms are beginning to see that what links their success to that
of the success of the locale and of the other stakeholders, so too can other
stakeholders be assisted to see where what is contributes to the firm’s success –
and that of other stakeholders – also contributes to their own. It is a bidirectional (truly a multi-directional) reality. That means that, at times, the best
“leverage” a firm has is to help others, such as a ruling elite, see their own
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personal benefit in initiatives that also assist other demographics and
stakeholders, stakeholders such as a governed minority or majority. Just as the
private sector stakeholder coalition has begun to see the self-interest in mutual
success, so too can the other stakeholders learn to see that as well – through
discussion and illustration but also through example, an example set by a private
sector exhibiting mutually successful behavior patterns.

Industry Diversification in Liberia

Two Different Firms, Two Different Mindsets
EBFand Mittal Steel: A Closer Look
In Monrovia, Equatorial Biofuels (EBF,) along with LIBINCO a firm in
Liberia since 1965, recently signed new concession agreements with the current
government renegotiating those signed two years ago with the transitional
government. Eight months of review of the original agreements reinstated
management contracts for the two firms for Decoris, Butaw and Fendell oil palm
plantations in Grand Bassa and Sinoe counties. (Liberia Private Sector
Investment Forum 2007; Christian Science Monitor 2008))
EBF, formerly Liberia Forest Products until 2006 when it was privatized
through purchase by Nardina Resources PLC, intends to create seed nurseries for
supplier plantations. (Corporate Council on Africa) They would do well to
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consider, as suggested in the first prescription listed above under the heading
Employment Regime, the composition of owners, managers, and other workers
within these supplier plantations. If they do, their very good idea to spread out
the wealth will succeed in generating for them, a successful return on their
investment.
EBF expects to hire 3,000 workers immediately and up to 60,000 workers
within the next seven years. It is within the terms of agreement that 75% of
management positions will be held by Liberians within ten years – indicating a
high level of understanding of the self-interest present in socially sustainable
economic development. (Chea-Annan 2007)
EBF’s concession agreement signals that it is well on its way toward
successful socially sustainable economic development. Its terms also signal that
EBF has begun mainstreaming the idea of investment protection through social
sustainability and conflict prevention and that it is being mainstreamed
throughout the firm and not only within a CSR department. Further evidence of
company-wide understanding and commitment is found in their presentation to
Liberia given by EBF President, Michael Frayne, 2008, in which the following
comments reflect such,. “… take a sustainable approach to social development”
(p.8) and not just economic development, “…create partnerships to rebuild social
and economic infrastructure,” (p.9) “…promote Liberia investment opportunity
to worldwide private finance sector.” (p.9)
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Additional items they should address through participation in a private
sector coalition include the proactive support and encouragement of small and
mid-sized enterprise creation. This is toward the goals of supporting wealth
spread and decreasing relative deprivations, its grievances, and those costs. This
support could be initiated through business trainings, business mentoring and
coaching programs, and through micro-loans and grants. These topics are
discussed in the Trainings and in the Wealth Spread headings under the Employee
and Community Opportunity element in this article.

Mittal Liberia chief executive Joseph Mathews insisted the deal his company
signed was legal. "We went ahead according to whatever the rules were on the
ground at that time," he said. (Law)

Human rights groups have
expressed concern about the deal
The two captions to the above picture express a growing reality. That
reality is that perhaps costs, avoidable costs, are incurred by firms when they go
forward in a setting with behaviors that are legal but which are perhaps, not yet
truly of a mutual benefit. Perhaps as firms we can save ourselves avoidable costs
by initiating behaviors whose results will be beneficial to all stakeholders even
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where alternatives to that would be considered legal. Legal doesn’t mean it is in
one’s own best self-interest. Finding what is in one’s own best self-interest is the
critical key. { Though knowing what is in the interest of other stakeholders is also
very important, what we are focused on within the scope of this paper is
specifically working to illustrate what is in the best interest of the firm – and how
to know it.}
Beginning with a strategic direction to a subset of CSR programs (Level I)
narrowing further through the use of common elements of conflict that resolve
and that become violent (Level II,) and then selecting a network of initiatives from
among the screening checklist (Level III) instead of a single, stand-alone
initiative, in coalition and under the direction of a Strategic Stabilization
Director, is a pathway to that key.
Third Opportunity: LABOR CONDITIONS

Other Losses That Look Like Wins
The primary and central issue in the case study of Liberia and of Firestone
is labor conditions. Encompassing housing, health, opportunity, and amounts and
types of physical labor, this issue is the major source of significant conflict for
Firestone in Liberia. At the center of all the pieces of this issue in the present
setting is what is known as the tapping quota. Workers, known as “tappers,” tap
the rubber trees for the liquid rubber each that is then transported to factories
outside of Liberia for processing. (Toolkit – Employee and Community
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Opportunity: 2b) This issue alone, at the heart of all other labor conditions,
reaches into questions of child labor, the ethics of humans used as beasts of
burden and even indentured servitude.
The tapping quota is causing conflicts though, for two reasons. First is
that, as we will see below, it is set too high. The second is that if a tapper fails to
reach the quota, he or she does not get paid for that day’s work. (The Analyst,
July 2008)
A system of measuring what is reasonably possible for a hardworking
tapper in an eight-hour work day followed by monthly, not daily, censure
processes – such as a note on the employee’s record, three monthly marks for
instance, forcing a termination – is a quite sensible, healthy, conflict-reducing
corporate policy. And too, such a policy would allow Firestone to gain legitimate
accountability of its workers’ productivity.
Today’s current quota however, interacts with the desires of families not
only to have pay for their work and to have a few hours off each day, but also
with each family’s desire to send their children to school. This is because with
the quota set at current levels, workers bring children to the plantation to aid them
in achieving their necessary quota to receive pay for the day. According to Dan
Adomitis, Firestone Liberia President, “the quota is reasonable…the work is fairly
balanced…each tapper will tap about 650 trees a day where they spend perhaps a
couple of minutes at each tree.” (Oke, 2005) His interviewer with CNN pointed
out to him that that amounted to 1300 minutes or more than 21 hours of work a
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day. “Fifteen year old Patrick says he’s been working at this plantation since
2003. He’s not been hired and he’s not being paid…” though he works there all
day, every day, seven days a week. (Oke, 2005) In 2005, an Alien Tort Claims
Act lawsuit was brought by the tappers against Bridgestone/Firestone alleging
serious labor abuses including child labor.
Alfred Brownell, one of a group of Liberian lawyers to visit the Firestone
Plantation at Harbel to document conditions, put it this way:
“When a child is around 9 or 10 years old, he starts going with his father
to the plantation to start working. There's hardly educational system (sic)
provided, the highest he can go is ninth grade. The wage is so minimal that they
can't get beyond that.”
(Oke, 2005)
Which then also causes Firestone Liberia to then have to defend itself as
not an employer of children.

Storage Tanks
Storage tanks, a second conflict issue, coincides with the tapping quota
issue. That is because in addition to tapping the trees, each tapper must also care
for the trees, pruning them and applying chemical fertilizers without safety gear.
The final piece of this occupation involves what is done with the syrup once it is
tapped. And it is here that the issue of child labor intersects these first two issues
because in order to accomplish all that is asked of them and receive that day’s
pay, tappers turn to their families who help them fulfill the duties. Formally,
Firestone is opposed to child labor, that is not in question. What is in question is
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whether the demands placed upon tappers are not only unreasonable but also
require them to employ their children’s labor to meet them.
Syrup is collected into pails of seventy five pounds. Two of these are
carried, at either end of a pole, by each tapper, several times a day, to be emptied
into and held at the storage tanks. These tanks for the culled syrup are an
expense, therefore only a few are built, lengthening the walk to as much as three
miles. (UCLA 2008) This can appear to be a win since keeping the number of
storage tanks low reduces one kind of cost. (Toolkit – Employee and Community
Opportunity: 2c)
However, when looked at more closely, we see that this has cost the firm
in productivity and in morale – and now, also, in negative publicity. Morale
losses further affect productivity. They will also be a contributor to potential
future security costs.
More tanks, at shorter distances, produce more tapping time (less transport
time) and less worker weariness. Both contribute to greater worker productivity
while at the same time reducing hostility toward the firm.
Additional improvement to the system, through the input of even lowlevel technologies to increase the ease with which larger syrup amounts can be
transported with each trip to the storage tanks, will further increase productivity.
In inverse proportion to the increase of physical ease to the worker, this added
technology will also decrease ill-will against the firm.
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We see in the tapping quota an example of a single point source creating
several interconnected conflicts. Fortunately, however, both source and
conflict(s) are easily identified through the first two lenses (levels) of the
Investment Sustainability Toolkit. Mitigation tactics, described above, were then
readily created through the third level, The Screening Checklist, once the primary
strategy (level 1) indicating those tactics has been adopted.

Other Labor Conditions
Let us now evaluate a more recent, 2005, concession agreement between
Firestone Liberia and Liberia from the lenses of the Investment Sustainability
Toolkit. The first item below is the concession agreement’s Statement from
Firestone Liberia. Following this is a summary of some of the agreed upon
points.
The 2005 revision is a “win-win” for people of Liberia
and Firestone. The Agreement will allow Firestone to plant
another generation of trees in Liberia. Liberians will gain not
only continued large-scale employment opportunities, but
also support to Liberian farmers for the replanting and
development of their own rubber farms. Students in the Harbel
area will benefit from Firestone’s assumption of responsibility
for and managing the Harbel Multilateral High School upon
government approval, building a new junior high school and
perhaps constructing a second new high school in the concession area. Firestone will also rebuild its Duside Hospital, which
was once one of Liberia’s finest hospitals, but was destroyed
during the period of civil strife in Liberia.
(firestonenaturalrubber.com)
And, assessing some of the agreed upon points from that 2005 concession
agreement between Liberia and Firestone Liberia, it does appear to be so.
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Rebuild Duside Hospital,
Rehabilitate housing destroyed in civil war,
Operate a high school,
Build a second high school (optional,)
Build a new Jr. high school,
Replant 5000 acres per year,
Give 600,000 rubber stumps per year to Liberian farmers,
Improve environmental impact assessment and mitigation.
Re-assessing this agreement however, from the lens of the Toolkit that
predicts greatest success through linkage of success of locale and other
stakeholders with firm success and armed with the knowledge that some
negotiations include Losses That Look Like Wins, we see that it may have a way
to go yet.

Housing and Energy

The rehabilitation of the housing is being done at a level that is in line
with Firestone’s “current standard for new housing.” (firestonenaturalrubber.com)
Citizens, though, have complained that the housing, cement blocks built into
rectangular shapes, is unfit for the conditions of the region – primarily, the heat.
There has been some ongoing additional confusion for some because the current
housing is in bad disrepair with Firestone having left off in repairing or
maintaining housing during the recent fighting which destroyed much of the
physical infrastructure of the area.
Because this is a particular complaint of the employees, the definition and
criteria of exactly what is meant by “Firestone’s current standard for new
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housing,” should be spelled out clearly. It would be valuable to the firm for
Firestone to then make that information as to what that term means, readily
available for all to see through posters and other communication sources. This
information however, is not easily located through search or through discussion
with Firestone Liberia personnel, leaving vague the understanding as to whether
this term has been yet defined.
A second point that surfaces from analysis of the recent concession
agreement is that Firestone plans to invest $100 million US over the next twenty
years. This is associated with an income of $1.6 billion US over that same twenty
years or a 6.1% re-investment plan. Given that the firm is already planning for
and is committed to this level of re-investment, it would again be valuable for the
firm and the private sector coalition, to put this information out there as clearly
and as often as possible while using multiple communication styles and pathways.
Among the chosen styles should be included several which help local workers and
community members to understand how these dollars translate into benefits in
their daily lives – what it means for them.
Energy access is another area of latent conflict. Firestone Liberia owns
their generators. They have power enough for the plantation but only just. This
causes confusion when public service is shut down on days when government
cannot meet local need but Firestone’s production on those days, goes on without
interruption. Along with this is the further question of where the power will come
from for growth in the firm’s plantations as well as for government to access for
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provision of public access as the rubber industry, and others, expand. Public
awareness campaigns to increase understanding of the complete scenario will not
only aid Firestone in this direct issue but will also move Firestone forward toward
greater continued transparency in all ways, increasing the level of good will
among the populace.

Health and Sanitation
Health (and for the firm, resulting productivity decreases) and Sanitation
is a further issue within the rubber industry. Onchocerciasis (River Blindness)
worms are prevalent at 80.8% on the Firestone Plantation – 1984 – and is
considered hyperendemic in the region of the Firestone Harbel plantation
according to a joint study by Johns Hopkins University Department of
Immunology and Infectious Diseases and the Liberian Institute for Biomedical
Research (American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene.) This illness is
caused by black fly bites which lay eggs in the skin and eyes and it can be treated
effectively with drugs. Its symptoms include itching, swelling of the cornea or
iris, blindness, elephantiasis, and skin thickening. (Anderson 2005) It is a source
of blindness and other health-related productivity decreases.
Proactive distribution of free medication for this illness will significantly
affect positive change in worker productivity. Further, additional productivity
gains are seen from financial support for the improvement of Health, Education,
and Transport through the contracting/grants process described in an earlier
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section. These contracts support specific proposals from governmental agencies
as well as from Liberian and International NGOs and firms. Specific proposals
are designed to ensure the presence of the necessary infrastructure for increased
access to medical care and pharmaceuticals and to ensure health improvements
for private sector success. (Toolkit – Economy-Related: 3, Employee and
Community Opportunity: 1,2f, Safety: 3)

Supply Chain
According to the Rubber Plantations Task Force – established by President
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and the UNMIL SRSG, Alan Doss, in February of 2006 –
Guthrie and Sinoe/Cocopa rubber plantations were under the control of guerilla
groups as recently as that month. (UNMIL Report 2006)
The task force reported on conditions at Cavalla, Sinoe, Guthrie, Cocopa,
Firestone, LAC, and Salala rubber plantations. It was found that Guthrie and
Sinoe/Cocopa were the two in greatest need as a result of having been taken over
by guerillas. They were established to provide additional sources of rubber latex
to Firestone for purchase by the firm and continue to provide that resource to
Firestone today. As a result, Firestone, through supply chain connections, is the
end recipient of the negative ramifications of events there.
The report highlighted a need for employment creation for the excombatants currently occupying both plantations. Both are in arrears on their

169

financial obligations to the government. Ownership and management company
rights are currently under review for both locations.
As of August, 2007, a consultative process had been established between
the ex-combatants holding the plantations, community members and leaders, and
county authorities. (UNMIL 2007) Issues under discussion include security and
rule of law on the plantations and in communities local to the plantations,
employment creation, and the legal tapping and selling of rubber.
The Rubber Planters Association of Liberia has been in the lead in the
interim management team created to manage these combatant-held rubber
plantations until a management firm can be selected through the legal selection
process. (UNMIL 2007) This team has a support group of other civil society
infrastructure as well as oversight from a board made up of ministerial level
officials.
International donor assistance with community projects in these locations
for health and education as well as for job creation – for both ex-combatants and
local populations – is being sought.
At issue here is the fact that other rubber firms in the area are purchasing
the rubber tapped at these combatant-held plantations leading the combatants to
prefer the option of continuing to illegally hold the plantations over participation
in the DDRR (Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration)
program. (Analyst, 2006) This program (DDRR) of the UN was closed as of
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October, 2007 with a report stating that 90,000 of the 103,000 demobilised troops
had been successfully reintegrated. (UNDP Liberia DDRR 2007)
An additional issue at the combatant-held sites is illegal detention. Illegal
security forces called Plant Protection Divisions (PPDs,) are illegally arresting,
detaining, trying, and punishing citizens for illegal rubber tapping and other
offenses. (Analyst, 2006) The cells for detention are also said to be inhumane,
being narrow and overcrowded while also lacking sanitation, ventilation, or
natural light. All detainees – male, female, children, and adults, are regularly
housed together. These private forces of security guards are said to be operating
through to punishment without oversight of any governmental law enforcement
agency. (Analyst, 2006)

Other Interventions During Same Time Period
1. Timing for Stabilization Perpetuation
It is during times of relative stability that opportunities to create the
institutions to perpetuate stability exist.
As we assess this time period for potential re-stabilizing initiatives by a
private sector coalition, we will be looking at both triggering events and at deeper
tensions. We will look at each with an eye toward what can be done if anything
to reduce or prevent each. No attempt at identifying these as causal will be
indicated. Each is mentioned only as a contributing factor, mitigation or
reduction of which reduces the escalation potential of the whole.
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In 2007, the following key points for successful investment protection
through linking firm success with others’ success were identified by the lens of
the Investment Sustainability Toolkit.
2007
¾ diversification (crops, industries, manufacturing)
¾ monitor governmental goals and actions
¾ while also monitoring economic and health metrics
Monitor Governmental Goals and Actions
The interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) adopted by Liberia’s
government in 2006 will act as its guide for two years. (National Investment
Council of Monrovia) It is a four pillar approach as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Enhancing National Security,
Revitalizing economic growth,
Strengthening governance and the rule of law, and
Rehabilitating infrastructure and basic service delivery.

Within those pillars and the two year timeframe, Liberia’s key priorities are as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Completing the reform of the security sector,
Revitalizing pro-poor agricultural growth,
Rebuilding transport and electrical networks,
Accelerating capacity building,
Strengthen private-sector growth and environment for such,
Create jobs, and
Promote good governance and the rule of law.
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Along with the PRS, a Governance and Economic Management Plan
(GEMAP) has also been adopted. It is this document that required the nowcompleted review of concession agreements with Firestone, Mittal, and all
concession agreements signed by preceding governments.
The Investor’s Guide to Liberia (2007) of the National Investment
Council of Monrovia indicates strong growth in percent of contribution from the
Service Sector to overall GDP – from 18 to 26% of GDP from 2000-2004. This
could be a significant and appropriate indication of successful movement in the
evolution of the economy from agriculture to manufacturing and then to a serviceorientation. However, this must be assessed cautiously since the statistics of the
World Bank (2008) indicate that agriculture as a percentage of the economy has
skyrocketed from 33% (1986) to 66% (2006.) During the same twenty years,
World bank statistics indicate that industry and services sectors have plummeted
(though manufacturing as a percentage of industry has crept up from 8-12% of
that sector.)
The current president, a Harvard educated economist, well understands
and is addressing many of the critical areas for successful reconstruction.
However, though President Sirleaf discusses pro-poor growth within economic
development in terms of her understanding of the benefits to the country, the
region, and to violence prevention, we must still question further. This is because
discussion within the government published Investor’s Guide to Liberia is of
Foreign Direct Investment only in terms of natural resources and not in terms of
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pro-poor, value-added investment – reflecting an older perception that all
economic development is equally beneficial. (Investor’s Guide, p.13) The same
source indicates an 8% growth in GDP for 2006 and a predicted decrease from
7.5% inflation in 2006 to 5% in 2008.

Monitor Economic and Health Indicators
Though the Investor’s Guide suggests promise, according to the World
Bank’s Data and Research office all other data points showed negative trends
between 1986 and 2006. External debt soared to nearly 600% of GDP, GDP itself
dropped from .93 Billion USD to .63, GNI per capita fell from 280 USD 1990 to
110 in 1995 and is now climbing – to 140 in 2006, and finally, exports fell from
50% of GDP in 1986 to 27.8% in 2006.
In the life and health category, the situation also suggests small mitigating
initiatives to the alert investor. Life expectany (42 yrs) is 17 years lower than the
average for all low-income countries while Tuberculosis has nearly tripled and
Onchocerciasis (River Blindness) is hyperendemic. Despite a surge in
immunizations, Infant and Child Mortality Rates have stayed constant at twice
that of the average of all low-income countries (15.7% of Infants and 23.5% of
Children under 5) between 1990 and 2005. The population has increased – itself
an issue – and, despite this, undernourishment continues to climb in percentage as
well as real numbers while access to Improved Sanitation has fallen from 39 to
27% of the population.
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And Economic Diversity
Major Private Sector Actors of Liberia as of 1998 and beyond:
Company
Bong Mining Co.
Firestone Plantations
The Liberia Company
LIAC
LISCO

Activity
Iron ore mining, Processing
Rubber plantations
Rubber plantations
Iron ore mining
Iron ore mining

Source: Europa Regional Survey 1998

Mittal Steel
Equatorial Biofuels Plc (EBF)

Steel
Palm Oils

Added 2007
Added 2007

Iron ore and rubber have led Liberian industry and Foreign Direct
Investment since Firestone opened the Harbel plantation in 1926. Cocoa too has
been an industry in Liberia since the early 1900s.
With the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Equatorial
Biofuels Plc (EBF), a United Kingdom public company, and the Liberian
government, to invest in the palm oil industry of Liberia, additional industries
begin to be developed supplementing those historically in Liberia. This
agreement and the developing industry it represents are in direct response to
efforts by the Liberian government to increase their edible oils industry while also
working to increase the markets for these products. (See Sidebar on EBF and
Mittal Steel, p.153)
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COUNTRY DATA

The Investor’s Guide to Liberia 2007 indicates an 8% growth in GDP for
2006 and a predicted decrease from 7.5% inflation in 2006 to 5% in 2008.
All other data points available for 1986 and also for 2006 (below) showed
negative trends in setting. (data points World Bank Data and Research.)

Economic Metrics
External debt soared to nearly 6 times (591% of) GDP.
GDP fell from 930 million USD to 630 million USD.
GNI per capita fell from 280 USD 1990 (per person per yr) to 140
USD. (GNI has been increasing since its low of 110 in 1995 to
130 in 2000 to 140 in 2006.)
Exports fell from 50% of GDP in 1986 to 27.8% in 2006.

Health and Life Metrics
No data is available on HIV/AIDS prevalence. Tuberculosis cases
however, have nearly tripled since 1990 – from 113 cases per
100K people to 301 fifteen years later.
Infant and Child Mortality Rates have stayed constant at twice that of the
average of all low-income countries (15.7% of Infants and 23.5%
of Children under 5) between 1990 and 2005. This constancy has
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appeared despite an increase in immunizations during this
timeframe to 94% of the population.
Life Expectancy is 42 years (2006,) 17 years less than the average life
expectancy for all low-income countries.
Undernourishment has increased since 1990 from 34% of the population
to 50% in 2005. (Population increased during this time by 50%.)
Improved Sanitation has fallen from 39 to 27% of the population with
access to improved sanitation.
Diseases such as Onchocerciasis (River Blindness) are hyperendemic in
many regions.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have taken a look at a few of the initiatives that have been identified
through the Investment Sustainability Toolkit during different time periods in the
most recent era of Liberian history. Though we cannot say definitively that these
would have been evident, we have taken care to assess each setting within its then
current context in an attempt to recreate each as closely as possible. In this way,
we have offered the best test of what can be identified by the toolkit from a
retrospective look.
Other issues in setting can be addressed by The Toolkit’s efforts even
without the specific issue having been identified. That is, that by mainstreaming
conflict prevention within the firm’s culture, behavior and choices will be affected
in such a way as to create action that reduces conflict and violence far prior to a
specific conflict, or factor leading up to a conflict, being identified on any early
warning screen.
Business has powerful, valuable roles to play in development and, through
development, in the prevention of destabilizing conflict. Through the increase of
stabilization, these roles will also have a recursive effect in increasing firms’ own
success and long-term profit stream protection.
The Investment Sustainability Toolkit goes the farthest among assessment
and prevention tools to protect both the state and the firm and to do so through
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articulation of these roles in development and violence prevention. The Toolkit
does so by working within three levels.
Governments of developing nations, as well as the private sector, can also
utilize the Toolkit. They could use it first as a check list themselves, in doing the
same things here recommended for the private sector. Additionally, it could be
employed toward the related goal of attracting Investment to aid the economic
development of their nation. This tool utilization will aid in insuring that any
attracted investment is of the wealth-spreading, socially sustainable type and will
therefore play a role in the state’s development that will be positive in the longterm as well as in the short.
The Investment Sustainability Toolkit is valuable to corporations and
governments, then, in two ways. The first is in project assessment phase by
allowing hidden costs to be revealed, costs which would otherwise decrease
projects’ sustainability and cause less-than-maximally successful projects to be
approved and implemented. This assessment portion of a project also will allow
for prevention behaviors or initiatives to be identified without which, projects that
would be profitable remain too risky and are not selected. This alleviates costs to
firm in the category of opportunity cost. Projects otherwise abandoned for risk
can proceed through identification of mitigating strategies, increasing benefit to
both the MNC and to the developing nation indicated by the project proposal.
The second is in allowing for on-going dynamic assessment to changing
conditions in the social groups – including their relationship to each other, to
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government, and to the firm – in the political structure, to local and global
economic factors, the environment and importantly, to other factors along these
and other dimensional lines not yet indicated or understood as factoring into the
sustainability and mutual-profitability equation.
Framework thus will be valuable in:
1. Allowing truly maximally successful projects to be selected,
2. Allowing projects that might otherwise not go forward to do so
based on successfully identified, low-cost initiatives to mitigate
and prevent conflict risk from manifesting,
3. Allowing for on-going mitigation of dynamic alterations to all
of the dimensions of the project’s sustainability – including
socio-politico-economic, environmental and importantly, as of
yet unidentified dimensions affecting outcome.
As the stakeholder with the greatest financial investment, often greater
than the local government, and therefore as the stakeholder with the most to lose
financially, corporations must include the costs of minimizing and mitigating
existing latent conflict risks in the assessment stage of their projects just as fees,
permits, and building materials would all be included as costs to the successful
start-up project. This they must do along with engagement in mitigation
strategies identified, not out of altruism alone, but out of their own best interest
and the primary fiduciary duty to stockholders as well – the protection of the
bottom line, investment, and long-term profit streams.
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Appendix I
Decision Making Tree
The Situation
Described

Decision Making Tree Showing Affect of Representational Systems
The Situation
Version 1

The Situation
Version 2

The Situation
Version 3

Step 2 then, is to cross compare the costs of options under any version with the
action options of any of the other versions.
This produces a differential diagnosis for us, of the situation at hand, representing
what is occurring in as many ways as it can be represented. In this way, we are
better able to do three things.
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1. stay open to all the representations and action options from each – instead of
going with, instinct driven, the first or most reinforcing representational system
2. See the costs of an action under one representative system when it is another
representational system that is more accurately describing the situation.
The Situation
Version 1

The Situation
Version 2

The Situation
Version 3

Blue lines represent costs of one action when interpreted through an alternative
representational system

This can assist with one of the most extensive and far-reaching challenges
involved in the prevention of conflict – and that challenge is present for public
sector, foreign-policy decision makers as well as for private-sector, corporate
decision makers – and that is, the “…capacity to know about and correctly
interpret events early…” (emphasis mine. George and Holl in Jentleson 2000)
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Appendix II
TIMELINE (BBC Oct 2007)
1979 - More than 40 people are killed in riots following a proposed increase
in the price of rice.
1980 - Master Sergeant Samuel Doe stages military coup. Tolbert and 13 of
his aides are publicly executed. A People's Redemption Council headed by Doe
suspends constitution and assumes full
powers.
1984 - Doe's regime allows return of political
parties following pressure from the United
States and other creditors.
1985 - Doe wins presidential election.
1989 - National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL) led by Charles Taylor begins an
uprising against the government.
1990 - Economic Community of West African
States (Ecowas) sends peacekeeping force.
Doe is executed by a splinter group of the
NPFL.

Samuel Doe: Leader of 1980 coup
was killed in 1990

On This Day 1980:
Deposed ministers
executed in Liberia

1991 - Ecowas and the NPFL agree to disarm and set up an Interim
Government of National Unity.
1992 - The NPFL launches an all-out assault on West African peacekeepers in
Monrovia, the latter respond by bombing NPFL positions outside the capital
and pushing the NPFL back into the countryside.
1993 - Warring factions devise a plan for a National Transitional Government
and a ceasefire, but this fails to materialise and fighting resumes.
1994 - Warring factions agree a timetable for disarmament and the setting
up of a joint Council of State.
1995 - Peace agreement signed.
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1996 April - Factional fighting resumes and
spreads to Monrovia.

CHARLES TAYLOR

1996 August - West African peacekeepers
begin disarmament programme, clear land
mines and reopen roads, allowing refugees to
return.
1997 July - Presidential and legislative
elections held. Charles Taylor wins a landslide
and his National Patriotic Party wins a majority Taylor and his forces in 1990,
during the rebellion against Doe
in the National Assembly. International
observers declare the elections free and fair.
1999 January - Ghana and Nigeria accuse
Liberia of supporting Revolutionary United
Front rebels in Sierra Leone. Britain and the
US threaten to suspend aid to Liberia.

Charles Taylor:
Preacher, warlord and
president

1999 April - Rebel forces thought to have come from Guinea attack town of
Voinjama. Fighting displaces more than 25,000 people.
1999 September - Guinea accuses Liberian forces of entering its territory and
attacking border villages.
2000 September - Liberian forces launch "massive offensive" against rebels
in the north. Liberia accuses Guinean troops of shelling border villages.
2001 February - Liberian government says Sierra Leonean rebel leader Sam
Bockarie, also known as Mosquito, has left the country.
2001 May - UN Security Council reimposes arms embargo to punish Taylor
for trading weapons for diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone.
2002 January - More than 50,000 Liberians and Sierra Leonean refugees flee
fighting. In February Taylor declares a state of emergency.
2003 March - Rebels advance to within 10km of Monrovia.
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2003 June - Talks in Ghana aimed at ending
rebellion overshadowed by indictment
accusing President Taylor of war crimes over
his alleged backing of rebels in Sierra Leone.
2003 July - Fighting intensifies; rebels battle
for control of Monrovia. Several hundred
people are killed. West African regional group
Ecowas agrees to provide peacekeepers.
2003: Citizens run for cover as

2003 August - Nigerian peacekeepers arrive. rebels, government forces clash
Charles Taylor leaves Liberia after handing power to his deputy Moses Blah.
US troops arrive. Interim government and rebels sign peace accord in Ghana.
Gyude Bryant chosen to head interim administration.
2003 September-October - US forces pull out. UN launches major
peacekeeping mission, deploying thousands of troops.
2004 February - International donors pledge more than $500m in
reconstruction aid.
2004 October - Riots in Monrovia leave 16 people dead; the UN says former
combatants were behind the violence.
2005 September - Liberia agrees that the international community should
supervise its finances in an effort to counter corruption.
2005 23 November - Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf becomes the first woman to be
elected as an African head of state. She takes
office the following January.
2006 February - Truth and Reconciliation
Commission is set up to investigate human
rights abuses between 1979 and 2003.
2006 April - Former president Charles Taylor
appears before a UN-backed court in Sierra
Leone on charges of crimes against humanity.
In June the Netherlands-based International
Criminal Court agrees to host his trial.

Rubber production is the backbone of
the economy

2006 June - UN Security Council eases a ban on weapons sales so Liberia can
arm newly trained security forces. An embargo on Liberian timber exports is
lifted shortly afterwards.
2006 July - President Johnson-Sirleaf switches on generator-powered street
lights in the capital, which has been without electricity for 15 years.
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2007 April - UN Security Council lifts its ban on Liberian diamond exports.
The ban was imposed in 2001 to stem the flow of "blood diamonds", which
helped to fund the civil war.
2007 May - UN urges Liberia to outlaw trial by ordeal.
2007 June - Start of Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague, where he
stands accused of instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone.
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Appendix III:
Information on Conflict Prevention work:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

USIP
Carnegie Studies on Violence Prevention
Fund for Peace
http://www.gppac.net/ global partnership for the prevention of
armed conflict
http://www.conflict-prevention.net/ European Center for
Conflict Prevention
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
FEWER – Forum for Early Warning and Early Response
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